Sartre's Existentialism Is a Humanism › Objections and Responses

The most serious objection to Sartre's view is that it seems to ignore the real constraints on human freedom. We are embodied creatures, shaped by genetics, upbringing, social position, economic circumstances. How can Sartre claim we are radically free when so much of our lives is determined by factors beyond our control? Sartre's response distinguishes between _facticity_ and _freedom_. Facticity refers to the given facts of our situation: our bodies, our histories, our social contexts. These are real and cannot be wished away. But freedom is how we relate to our facticity, the meaning we give it, the projects we undertake within it. A person born into poverty did not choose that circumstance. But they choose how to respond to it: with resignation, resentment, determination, creativity. A person with a disability did not choose their body. But they choose what that disability means for their life, what projects to pursue, what identity to construct. The facts constrain the possibilities, but they do not determine the choice among possibilities. This response has force, but critics argue it understates how severely circumstances can limit options. When someone faces genuine coercion, or when poverty leaves only terrible choices, speaking of "freedom" can seem tone-deaf. Sartre was aware of this tension. He was a committed leftist who believed in collective action to change oppressive structures. He insisted that even within oppression, human freedom persists, and that this freedom is the basis for resistance. But he also acknowledged that material conditions matter enormously and that changing them is a moral imperative. The slave who recognizes their freedom is already on the path to liberation; the slave who accepts their condition as natural has surrendered their humanity. Yet recognizing freedom is not the same as having good options. A second objection concerns the apparent subjectivism of Sartre's ethics. If each person creates their own values, how can we condemn anyone? Isn't this just moral relativism dressed up in philosophical language? Sartre's response appeals to the universal dimension of choice. When I choose, I choose for all humanity. I implicitly declare that this is how a human being should act. This means I cannot escape judgment. If I choose to deceive, I am declaring that deception is acceptable human conduct, and I must be willing to accept a world in which everyone deceives. If I am not willing to accept that world, then my choice is in bad faith. Moreover, there is one value that existentialism cannot deny: freedom itself. Any attempt to suppress human freedom, whether through totalitarianism, manipulation, or the denial of agency, is condemned by the very structure of existentialist thought. We cannot coherently value our own freedom while denying the freedom of others. Whether this is enough to ground a robust ethics remains debated. Critics argue that the universalizability test is too thin to rule out many harmful choices, and that valuing freedom does not tell us how to adjudicate conflicts between freedoms. Sartre's ethics remains more a starting point than a complete system.