The limits of philosophical demonstration › Possibility does not mean constant confusion

An opponent raises an obvious difficulty. If radically different outcomes are possible, how can anyone confidently go about ordinary life? In al-Ghazali's example, someone might leave a book at home and return wondering whether it has become an animal. Once the usual connections are denied necessity, what protects ordinary expectations?

Al-Ghazali answers by distinguishing what is possible from what is expected or known to occur. In the theological account developed here, God can create knowledge that the extraordinary event will not occur. Repetition of the ordinary sequence also establishes expectation. The admission of an alternative possibility does not require a person to treat that alternative as imminent.

This reply belongs to his account of divine power and knowledge. It is more than the modest observation that unusual things are unlikely. The reader should ask whether it explains our confidence or assumes the reliability that the objection puts in question. Recognizing the question helps us assess his answer without pretending that he never saw the problem.

A hypothetical illustration can clarify the logical distinction without proving his theology. You might know that a locked door could be opened by someone with a key while expecting it to remain shut tonight. Recognizing a possibility does not require predicting its occurrence. The example concerns the relationship between possibility and expectation; it does not establish that natural connections resemble locks or that miracles occur.

The same restriction applies to the cotton argument. Showing that an alternative has not been ruled out is not evidence that someone has witnessed it. Al-Ghazali's defense of a miracle's possibility and the historical evidence for a reported miracle are separate questions. Keeping them apart prevents a philosophical objection from becoming an unsupported empirical claim.