Locke's Two Treatises of Government: The Blueprint for Modern Freedom

Who owns you? The question sounds strange, but how you answer it determines everything about politics. If a king owns his subjects as a father owns his children, then absolute monarchy makes sense. If God grants dominion to certain rulers, then divine right follows naturally. But if you own yourself, if no one has authority over you without your consent, then the entire structure of political power must be rebuilt from the ground up.

John Locke chose the third answer, and in doing so, he articulated what would become one of the most influential philosophical foundations for modern liberal democracy. The Two Treatises of Government, published anonymously in 1689 (though likely written several years earlier during the Exclusion Crisis), challenged the reigning justifications for absolute monarchy and offered an alternative: a theory of government based on natural rights, popular consent, and the right of the people to overthrow tyrants. The American Declaration of Independence, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, and many subsequent democratic constitutions draw on ideas Locke helped shape, though the precise extent of his direct influence on each remains a matter of scholarly discussion.

What makes Locke's work so enduring is not just its historical influence but its continued relevance. Many debates about the limits of government power, the nature of property rights, the legitimacy of taxation, and the conditions under which resistance to authority is justified still operate within the conceptual framework Locke helped establish. To understand modern political thought, engaging with Locke is essential.

Locke wrote the Two Treatises during one of the most turbulent periods in English history. The seventeenth century had seen civil war, the execution of a king, a republican experiment under Cromwell, the restoration of the monarchy, and ongoing battles between Crown and Parliament over the limits of royal power. The fundamental question was unresolved: where does political authority come from, and what are its limits?

The dominant theory, vigorously defended by Robert Filmer in his Patriarcha, held that kings ruled by divine right inherited from Adam. God had granted Adam dominion over the earth and all its creatures, including his descendants. This authority passed through the generations to legitimate monarchs. Just as children owe obedience to their fathers, subjects owe absolute obedience to their kings. Resistance is not merely illegal but sinful.

This was not merely an academic doctrine. It had real political consequences. If the king's authority comes from God and inheritance, then Parliament has no legitimate basis to constrain royal power. The people have no right to resist, no matter how tyrannical the ruler becomes. The entire constitutional struggle between Crown and Parliament depended on whether Filmer's theory could be refuted.

Locke saw that defeating absolutism required more than political maneuvering. It required demolishing the philosophical foundations on which it rested and constructing an alternative theory of legitimate government. The Two Treatises accomplishes both tasks: the First Treatise systematically dismantles Filmer's patriarchal theory, while the Second Treatise builds Locke's positive account of political authority.

The First Treatise receives less attention today because Filmer's theory no longer has many defenders. But Locke's critique is thorough and often incisive. He attacks on multiple fronts.

First, Locke challenges the biblical interpretation. Even granting that God gave Adam dominion over the earth, this was dominion over animals and plants, not over other human beings. The text does not support the claim that Adam had political authority over Eve or his descendants. Filmer has simply misread Scripture.

Second, even if Adam did have such authority, there is no clear line of inheritance to any current monarch. Adam's authority would have passed to his eldest son, but the genealogical record is hopelessly obscure. No king can actually trace his lineage back to Adam in an unbroken chain. The practical implications of patriarchalism are therefore impossible to determine.

Third, Locke argues that paternal and political authority are fundamentally different in kind. A father's authority over young children is temporary and limited, based on the child's need for care and guidance. It ends when the child reaches maturity. Political authority over adult citizens cannot be derived from this model. To treat subjects as perpetual children is to misunderstand both childhood and citizenship.

The First Treatise clears the ground. With Filmer refuted, Locke can build his own theory.

Locke's positive theory begins with a thought experiment: imagine human beings living without any government at all. What would this "state of nature" be like? What rights would people have? What problems would arise?

This is not a historical claim about how humans actually lived long ago. It is a thought experiment designed to separate what is natural from what is conventional, what belongs to us simply as human beings from what we acquire through political arrangements. Understanding the state of nature helps us see what government is for and what limits should constrain it.

Locke's state of nature is emphatically not the war of all against all that Hobbes described. It is a condition of freedom and equality, governed by natural law. Human beings in this state have no political superiors. No one is born the subject of another. But this freedom is not license to do whatever one pleases.

The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.

The law of nature, which we can discover through reason, establishes that all human beings have fundamental rights that others must respect. These rights do not come from government. They exist before government and provide the standard by which government must be judged.

At the heart of Locke's political philosophy is his theory of natural rights. Every person, simply by being human, possesses rights to life, liberty, and property that exist independently of government. These rights are not gifts from the state. For Locke, they are natural endowments that government exists to protect.

The right to life is fundamental. No one may take another's life except in self-defense or as punishment for violating the law of nature. This right grounds the prohibition on murder and also implies a duty to preserve oneself.

The right to liberty means that no one is naturally subject to the will of another. We are born free, not as slaves or subjects. Any authority over us requires our consent. This does not mean we can do anything we want (natural law constrains us), but it means no human being has inherent authority to command us.

The right to property is Locke's most innovative and influential contribution. In the state of nature, the earth and its resources are given to humanity in common. But how can private property arise from this common inheritance? Locke's answer is labor.

Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.

When you mix your labor with something from the common stock, when you gather acorns, catch fish, or cultivate land, you make it your own. The labor you invest creates a property right. No one else can claim what you have worked to produce.

This labor theory of property has important implications and limitations. Locke adds two provisos. First, you may only take as much as you can use before it spoils. Hoarding resources while others starve violates natural law. Second, you must leave "enough, and as good" for others. Taking from the common stock is legitimate only when it does not deprive others of the chance to do the same.

Money complicates matters. Unlike food, money does not spoil, so the spoilage proviso no longer limits accumulation. People can now legitimately acquire more than they can immediately use by exchanging perishable goods for durable currency. Locke sees this as a tacit agreement that enables greater productivity and prosperity. Critics argue it opens the door to the very inequalities the provisos were meant to prevent.

If the state of nature is governed by natural law and people have natural rights, why leave it? Why create government at all?

Locke's answer is that the state of nature, while not a war of all against all, has serious "inconveniences" that make it unstable. Three problems stand out.

First, there is no established, known law. Natural law exists, but people interpret it differently. Disputes arise about what natural law actually requires. Without an authoritative statement of the rules, disagreements multiply.

Second, there is no impartial judge. When conflicts occur, each party judges their own case. But people are biased in their own favor. Self-interest distorts judgment, making fair resolution difficult.

Third, there is no power to enforce judgments. Even when the right course of action is clear, there may be no way to compel compliance. The injured party must rely on their own strength, which may be insufficient against a powerful aggressor.

These problems do not make the state of nature intolerable, but they make it precarious. Life, liberty, and property are insecure. People have strong reasons to seek a more stable arrangement.

Government arises through consent. People agree to leave the state of nature and form a political community. They give up certain natural powers, especially the power to enforce natural law on their own, in exchange for the security that organized government provides.

For Locke, this consent is the sole source of legitimate political authority. No one is born a subject. No one inherits an obligation to obey. Authority exists only because people have agreed to it.

Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent.

The social contract creates two distinct things: political society (the community of citizens) and government (the institutions that exercise power). Government serves political society, not the other way around. If government fails in its duties, political society can replace it.

What exactly do people consent to? Not unlimited government. They agree to be bound by majority rule within a framework that protects their fundamental rights. They authorize government to make and enforce laws, but only laws that serve the public good, specifically the protection of life, liberty, and property.

Locke's theory is fundamentally about limited government. The social contract does not hand rulers unlimited power. It creates a trust, and trustees can act only within the terms of that trust.

Several specific limits follow. Government cannot rule by arbitrary decree. It must govern through standing laws that are publicly known and equally applied. The rule of law, not the whims of rulers, is essential to legitimate government.

Government cannot take property without consent. Taxation requires the agreement of the people or their representatives. This is the theoretical foundation of "no taxation without representation." Property rights exist prior to government and cannot be violated by government except through legitimate procedures.

Government cannot transfer its legislative power to others. The people entrusted lawmaking to a specific body. That body cannot hand off its authority to someone else without going back to the people for fresh consent.

Government's purpose is limited to protecting natural rights. It has no authority to pursue other ends, however noble they might seem. The scope of legitimate government action is bounded by its founding purpose.

Locke also sketches a theory of the separation of powers, though less systematically than Montesquieu would later. He distinguishes three powers: legislative, executive, and federative.

The legislative power is supreme. It makes the laws that govern society, but it need not be continuously in session. Once laws are made, they remain in force until changed.

The executive power enforces the laws and handles day-to-day governance. Unlike the legislature, it must be continuously active. Locke recognizes that the executive needs some discretion (what he calls prerogative) to act when the law is silent or when strict application would cause harm.

The federative power handles relations with other states: war, peace, treaties, alliances. Locke treats this as conceptually distinct from executive power, though he acknowledges that in practice they are usually held by the same hands.

The key insight is that concentrating all power in the same hands is dangerous. Those who make laws should not also enforce them, or they will be tempted to exempt themselves from their own rules. Separating powers provides a check on abuse.

The most radical part of Locke's theory is his defense of the right to revolution. If government exists by consent and for the protection of rights, what happens when government betrays that trust? What happens when rulers become tyrants?

Locke's answer is clear: the people may resist and, if necessary, overthrow tyrannical government. When rulers violate the fundamental terms of the social contract, when they systematically attack the life, liberty, or property of citizens, they dissolve the bonds of obligation. They put themselves in a state of war with the people.

Whenever the legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience.

This is not a license for rebellion at every grievance. Locke is clear that people are slow to resist, that they endure much before taking up arms. Revolution is a last resort when a "long train of abuses" makes tyrannical intent unmistakable. But the right exists, and it serves as the ultimate check on governmental power.

Critics worried this doctrine would lead to constant instability. Locke argued the opposite: rulers who know they can be held accountable are more likely to govern well. The right to revolution acts as a deterrent, promoting good governance rather than undermining it.

Objection 1: Did anyone actually consent?

The most persistent criticism of social contract theory is simple: the original contract never happened. No one alive today signed anything. How can we be bound by an agreement we never made?

Locke distinguishes express consent (explicit agreement) from tacit consent. Those who explicitly join a political community are clearly bound. But even those who merely enjoy the benefits of society, traveling on public roads or owning property protected by law, give tacit consent to the government that provides these benefits.

Critics find this response inadequate. Tacit consent seems too easy to attribute. Does someone born into a society with no realistic option to leave really consent? Can mere residence count as agreement to whatever the government does? These questions remain contested.

Objection 2: Does labor really create property rights?

Locke's labor theory of property faces several challenges. Why should mixing labor with something make it yours rather than simply losing your labor? If I pour my can of tomato juice into the ocean, do I own the ocean or have I just wasted my tomato juice?

More seriously, the provisos that limit appropriation may be impossible to satisfy in a world of scarcity. There is no longer "enough, and as good" land for everyone. Does this mean all current property holdings are illegitimate? Or do the provisos only apply to initial acquisition, not to subsequent transfers?

Defenders argue that Locke's theory captures something important about the moral significance of labor, even if the details need refinement. Critics argue that property rights require social conventions and cannot be grounded in nature alone.

Objection 3: Is the theory too individualistic?

Communitarian critics argue that Locke's emphasis on individual rights neglects how social human beings really are. We are not isolated atoms who choose to form society. We are born into communities that shape who we are. The social contract picture distorts this reality.

Locke might respond that the state of nature is not meant as anthropology. It is a way of identifying what we owe each other as human beings, apart from any particular social arrangement. Just because we are always embedded in communities does not mean those communities can do whatever they want to us.

Objection 4: Does Locke's theory justify colonialism?

Locke's labor theory of property was used historically to justify European appropriation of indigenous lands. If land that is not cultivated in European fashion is not truly "owned," then colonizers who cultivate it might claim legitimate title. Locke himself was involved in colonial administration, serving as secretary to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina and helping draft the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina.

This criticism has generated substantial scholarly attention. Some argue that Locke's theory, properly understood, does not support colonial appropriation because indigenous peoples did labor on and cultivate their lands, just not in ways European observers recognized. Others argue that the theory's logic, whatever Locke's intentions, lends itself to justifying dispossession. Still others focus on Locke's personal involvement in colonial enterprises as evidence of how he understood his own theory. The debate continues, raising important questions about how we should read historical texts whose authors held views we now find troubling.

Locke's ideas are so deeply embedded in modern political thought that we often fail to recognize them as ideas at all. They have become the water we swim in. Making them explicit reveals both their continued relevance and their continued contestation.

In constitutional design, Locke's influence is substantial, though historians debate its precise extent. The American Declaration of Independence's assertion that governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed" and exist to protect "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" echoes Lockean themes (though Jefferson's substitution of "happiness" for Locke's "property" has generated much scholarly discussion). The Bill of Rights, with its protections against arbitrary government action, reflects principles Locke articulated. The separation of powers owes more to Montesquieu's later elaboration, but the underlying idea of limited government with distinct institutional functions appears in Locke's work.

Understanding Locke helps us see what these institutions are for. They are not merely procedural arrangements. They embody a substantive theory about the purpose and limits of political authority. When we debate constitutional interpretation, we are often debating how to apply Lockean principles to new situations.

In debates about liberty and authority, Locke provides one influential framework. How much can government regulate in the name of public health? What are the limits of police power? When does taxation become confiscation? These questions arise constantly, and the answers often depend on views about natural rights and the proper scope of government that Locke helped articulate.

The libertarian tradition draws heavily on Locke's emphasis on property rights and limited government. The liberal tradition draws on his emphasis on consent and individual liberty. Even those who reject Locke's conclusions sometimes find themselves engaging with the terms of debate he helped establish.

In thinking about resistance and political change, Locke remains relevant. When is civil disobedience justified? When does protest become legitimate resistance? Under what conditions, if any, is revolution permissible? These questions have not gone away. Movements for political change around the world raise the question of when citizens may resist their government. Locke does not provide easy answers, but his framework helps structure the inquiry.

Locke's answer, that resistance is justified when government systematically violates the rights it was instituted to protect, provides a framework for thinking through these cases. It neither endorses every act of resistance nor condemns all of them. It asks us to evaluate whether the conditions for legitimate government have been violated.

In debates about property and inequality, Locke's theory remains contested. Does the labor theory of property justify current distributions of wealth? Do the provisos require redistribution when some have vastly more than others? Can Lockean principles ground a welfare state, or do they preclude it?

These debates play out in tax policy, inheritance law, intellectual property, and many other areas. The answers are not obvious, but the questions are framed by concepts Locke introduced: natural rights to property, the conditions of legitimate appropriation, and the relationship between labor and ownership.

In the digital age, new questions arise that Locke could not have anticipated, yet his framework offers some traction. Who owns data generated by your online activity? If property rights derive from labor, does the work of generating data create a claim to it? Is there a natural right to privacy that limits government surveillance? When platform companies exercise significant power over users, do they take on obligations like those Locke assigned to governments? These questions have no obvious Lockean answers, but thinking through them in Lockean terms can clarify what is at stake.

Locke's influence on later political thought has been profound, though scholars debate its exact shape. The American founders knew his work, and many drew on it, though they also engaged with other traditions like classical republicanism and Scottish Enlightenment thought. Jefferson's Declaration shares significant themes with Locke, though whether Jefferson drew directly on Locke or on a broader tradition Locke helped shape remains debated. The tradition of classical liberalism, from Adam Smith through John Stuart Mill to contemporary libertarians, builds on foundations Locke helped establish, even as each thinker transformed the inheritance in their own way.

The social contract tradition continued through Rousseau, who pushed Locke's ideas in more democratic and communitarian directions, and Kant, who gave the theory a more rigorous philosophical foundation. In the twentieth century, John Rawls revived social contract thinking, using it to derive principles of justice rather than principles of legitimate government.

Locke also influenced traditions that seem opposed to liberalism. Marx's critique of capitalism engages seriously with Lockean property theory, arguing that the conditions of legitimate appropriation cannot be satisfied under capitalism. Even to reject Locke, you must reckon with him.

The tensions within Locke's thought continue to generate debate. Is he primarily a theorist of limited government or of property rights? Does his theory support or undermine egalitarianism? How should we read his views on toleration alongside his exclusion of Catholics and atheists? These questions keep Locke scholarship vital.

Beyond the West, Locke's ideas have traveled globally. Constitutional democracies around the world incorporate Lockean principles. Debates about human rights often invoke natural rights language that traces back to Locke. The global spread of liberal democratic ideals, and the backlash against them, is part of Locke's ongoing legacy.

• John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (edited by Peter Laslett). The standard scholarly edition with extensive introduction and notes.
• A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights. A careful philosophical reconstruction and defense of Locke's theory.
• James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries. An influential interpretation emphasizing the limits Locke places on appropriation.
• Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government. Places Locke's work in its historical and political context.
• Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality. Explores the religious foundations of Locke's political egalitarianism.