Schellenberg's Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason

Imagine a person who would welcome a relationship with a loving God. She has no wish to escape divine scrutiny. She would be glad to discover that prayer addresses someone real. Yet she remains unable to believe. Trying harder to want a belief does not make it appear.

That situation raises a question about God as well as about the seeker. If a perfectly loving creator exists, why would a person capable of relationship with that creator be unable to begin one? J. L. Schellenberg develops this challenge in Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason. The book, first published in 1993, argues that reasonable nonbelief counts against the existence of God. The force of the argument depends on the connection between divine love and the availability of personal relationship. Schellenberg's account of the book.

The question does not require a demand for a spectacular sign. A person might have ample reason to believe that someone exists without seeing a public demonstration. Nor does it require that every doubter feel distressed. The central issue is whether a capable person who is not resisting relationship can lack the belief needed for it. That makes the argument more specific than a complaint that religious life sometimes feels difficult.

The original book speaks of reasonable or inculpable nonbelief. Here, reasonable does not simply mean that an argument for atheism sounds persuasive. It concerns nonbelief not culpably produced by the person. Schellenberg's later formulations focus more narrowly on nonresistant nonbelief. His retrospective “Précis” explains why the change matters: general faultlessness is a stronger requirement than the argument needs. The relevant resistance is resistance to God that causes the person's nonbelief. Schellenberg, “Précis,” author-hosted version, pp. 2–4.

Someone may be careless about an unrelated obligation yet not be avoiding God. Conversely, someone may sincerely report openness while their nonbelief partly results from avoidance they do not recognize. The later category concerns the causal role of resistance, rather than whether a person has an otherwise admirable character. We should therefore avoid equating nonresistance with an absence of conscious hostility, or with an impressive record of religious effort.

In the account that follows, the original book supplies the starting point and the later writings clarify the formulation. This distinction prevents us from silently assigning every later term to the earlier text. Schellenberg also later makes the intended necessity of the central conceptual premises more explicit: he regards them as requirements of perfect love, rather than as predictions based on what God usually prefers to do.

That last distinction broadens the inquiry. Schellenberg discusses former believers whose investigations eroded a belief they wanted to retain. He also discusses people for whom theism has never been a live option. A lack of acquaintance with the concept of a perfectly loving creator does not automatically exclude someone. The question is whether the person has the relevant capacities for relationship, not whether their culture has already supplied the required theological vocabulary. “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals,” section I.

Schellenberg's target is a perfectly loving personal God. He argues that a personal religious ultimate must be perfectly loving. The immediate conclusion concerns that God. Rejecting such a being would not, by itself, show that every possible religious conception is false, or establish that the physical world exhausts reality. Schellenberg explicitly distinguishes his atheism about a personal ultimate from metaphysical naturalism. “Précis,” pp. 5–8.

The developed argument can be reconstructed in six steps:

1. A perfectly loving God would always be open to personal relationship with every created person capable of it.
2. Such openness would leave each capable person able to participate just by trying, unless resistance on the person's side placed them in a contrary position.
3. Being in that position requires belief that God exists.
4. Therefore, if a perfectly loving God existed, capable persons would never lack that belief nonresistantly.
5. Some capable persons have lacked that belief nonresistantly.
6. Therefore, no perfectly loving God exists. Given the further premise that God would be perfectly loving, God does not exist.

This is a deductive reconstruction of Schellenberg's reasoning, not a quotation or a poll of philosophical opinion. If its premises hold, the conclusion follows. Whether the premises hold is the disputed issue. The conceptual link between love and constant availability needs defense, and the existence of nonresistant nonbelief needs support. Logical validity does not remove either task. Schellenberg's later explicit formulations, “Précis,” pp. 2–3 and 10.

Notice the timing. The argument concerns a person's condition at a time when they are capable of relationship. An eventual opportunity is not automatically enough to satisfy a claim about availability whenever the capacity exists. A defender who proposes eventual revelation must therefore explain why temporary nonavailability can accord with perfect love, rather than treating the eventual outcome as a complete answer.

The reasoning also explains why this is not a general inference from invisibility to nonexistence. If a hypothesis gives us no reason to expect awareness of its object, a lack of awareness may tell us little. Schellenberg thinks perfect personal love creates just such an expectation: an available relationship requires a condition that some people lack. The dispute therefore concerns that expectation and the alleged counterexamples. A critic who simply observes that unseen things can exist has not yet addressed the argument; a defender who merely observes widespread doubt has not yet established its conceptual premise.

Schellenberg's account of love goes beyond benevolence at a distance. He argues that perfect love values conscious relationship for its own sake. It would therefore keep relationship possible for those loved, rather than merely confer benefits while making mutual recognition unavailable. His analogies include admirable parents, siblings, and friends. These examples support a proposed understanding of love; they are not empirical measurements of God's behavior. “The Sounds of Silence Stilled,” section 1.

The distinction between an open relationship and an established one does much of the work. A person might know that God exists and decline to trust or worship. Schellenberg does not infer that God would compel every creature to enter a relationship. His claim is that capable, nonresistant creatures would be able to do so. The person retains a choice about the relationship even when the other's existence is beyond doubt.

As a simple illustration, knowing that a friend is reachable does not compel me to call. It makes calling an available action. If I cannot establish that the friend exists, the obstacle is different from reluctance to pick up the phone. The analogy isolates availability. It does not imply that human friends owe one another constant access, or that a relationship with God would resemble a telephone conversation.

The capacities qualification also matters. The argument does not demand identical beliefs from every human being at every developmental stage. It concerns persons capable of the conscious relationship at issue. Excluding those who lack the capacities does not say that God could not love them in other ways. It limits the inference about which form of relationship divine love would make available.

The kind of personal relationship Schellenberg means is conscious and reciprocal: each party recognizes the other. A person cannot consciously thank God for a gift as God's gift while entirely lacking belief that God exists. The person might still act generously, feel gratitude toward life, or benefit from God without recognizing the source. Those would be different descriptions of the situation. Whether implicit relations would satisfy perfect love is an objection to the love-and-openness premise, rather than a straightforward refutation of what Schellenberg means by conscious relationship. “Précis,” p. 4.

This requirement is modest in one respect and demanding in another. It does not require exhaustive knowledge of God or an uninterrupted feeling of divine presence. It does require a belief that the person cannot necessarily produce by choosing. Deciding to pray conditionally, or deciding to investigate, differs from coming to see the proposition that God exists as true. In his later account Schellenberg emphasizes this involuntary aspect of belief.

Consider someone who hopes that a missing relative is alive. The person can act on that hope, continue searching, and refuse to give up. Those actions do not necessarily produce the belief that the relative is alive. Likewise, a person can keep religious possibilities open without already believing. This is a teaching analogy about attitudes toward a proposition. It does not settle whether hopeful religious practice could itself be a valuable way of relating to God.

Schellenberg's affirmative case includes people whose sincere investigation undermines a belief they would prefer to preserve. Wanting to continue believing can be evidence against the suggestion that they are escaping an unwanted relationship. He also appeals to people with no prior access to theistic belief. His claim is not that everyone who calls themselves open must be correctly describing their motives. It is that nonbelief is not always caused by resistance to God. “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals,” section I.

A critic can question these cases. Self-interpretation can be mistaken, and whether someone has the relevant capacities may be unclear. But the positions in this dispute should be stated precisely. Defeating the argument does not require proving that nonresistant nonbelievers are impossible. A critic could instead provide reasons to withhold assent from the claim that any actual instance has been established. Conversely, uncertainty about one person does not establish that every nonbeliever resists God.

The existential premise is enough for the deductive structure if even one actual person at one relevant time satisfies it. That feature explains why counting believers and nonbelievers would not settle the issue. A survey could record reported beliefs; the argument additionally concerns capacities and the causes of nonbelief. Neither the popularity of religion nor the popularity of doubt decides those questions by itself.

A familiar response says that unmistakable divine presence would threaten freedom. Schellenberg answers that belief in someone's existence does not compel love for that person. Providing a condition of a free relationship need not remove the freedom to decline it. He also does not require theatrical revelation, or the same evidence for everyone. He discusses more personally appropriate forms of evidence. “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals,” section III.

The objection can be made stronger than the claim that awareness mechanically forces love. Awareness of a powerful creator could affect motives: a person might respond from fear or self-interest. The issue would then be whether a loving God could disclose enough to make relationship available while leaving room for a suitable response. Schellenberg's emphasis on divine resourcefulness puts pressure on a defense that assumes every effective disclosure must overwhelm the recipient.

Jeffrey Jordan offers a related but distinct challenge. He distinguishes belief from acceptance, a voluntary decision to use a proposition in deliberation and act on it. Perhaps God could value a freely undertaken process of acceptance and the cultivation of belief, rather than providing belief at the outset. That challenges the claim that love must ensure immediate belief, rather than simply asserting that every nonbeliever is resistant. Jordan, “The Sounds of Silence,” objections 1 and 3.

Schellenberg replies that acceptance alone does not provide the mutual recognition involved in the relationship he is discussing. He also asks why a loving God would make someone undertake a process that takes time before belief becomes available. The disagreement therefore returns to the kind of relationship love requires and when it must be possible. Calling one attitude faith does not, by itself, settle whether it meets that requirement. “The Sounds of Silence Stilled,” sections 2–3.

Another response allows nonresistant nonbelief but proposes reasons for permitting it. Perhaps delayed revelation could cultivate responsibility, humility, or a more mature relationship later. This directly contests Schellenberg's claim that perfect love necessarily entails constant openness. The objection is not answered merely by repeating that love matters: it asks whether love could reasonably accept a temporary loss of availability for a sufficiently important good.

Schellenberg's answer emphasizes alternatives. An infinitely resourceful God might cultivate these goods within a relationship. A person could retain belief in God's existence while experiencing uncertainty about a decision, discovering moral weaknesses, or losing an earlier feeling of comfort. His distinction is between withdrawal within an available relationship and nonbelief that prevents such relationship. Showing a possible benefit of uncertainty does not yet show a need for the latter. “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals,” section III.

A defender may still think that some goods require the stronger condition, or that our grasp of divine reasons is limited. The argument's deductive ambition makes a coherent counterpossibility relevant. But simply naming an unknown reason does not demonstrate that it is compatible with the proposed conception of perfect love. The reader needs to assess the competing accounts of what love permits. Schellenberg argues for a demanding account; his critics can challenge it without denying the value of relationship.

Schellenberg argues that hiddenness deserves consideration independently of the problem of evil. A nonbeliever could be contented and still lack an available conscious relationship with God. The argument would retain its structure. Pain caused by uncertainty may make an example emotionally urgent, but the proposed conflict concerns love's openness rather than suffering alone. “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals,” section III and note 5.

Keeping these questions separate also prevents a mistake about religious experience. A believer can feel abandoned while continuing to believe that God exists. Schellenberg discusses that possibility as withdrawal within relationship. His argument targets nonbelief, which removes a condition of the conscious reciprocal relationship. A response to one experience cannot simply be assumed to explain the other.

The argument supplies no license to diagnose another person's inner life from a distance. Suppose a family member says that they cannot believe despite wanting to. One can discuss whether the claim is accurate while taking the report seriously. Immediately inferring secret hostility substitutes an explanation for an investigation. Believers and nonbelievers alike can distinguish a disagreement over evidence from a judgment about someone's character.

For a person uncertain about religion, Schellenberg offers a more precise set of questions than whether they have tried hard enough. What kind of God is being considered? What relationship would that God's love make possible? Does the person's difficulty concern a missing belief, a painful experience within belief, or resistance to a relationship? Those situations call for different arguments. Treating them as interchangeable obscures what needs an answer.

There is also a limited analogy for leadership. A manager who invites concerns but supplies no usable way to raise them has left a condition of participation unmet. Making the channel available does not force anyone to use it. This illustrates the difference between enabling a relationship and compelling participation. It does not transfer Schellenberg's theological conclusion to organizations: human leaders have limited resources and other obligations. The practical lesson is to examine whether a claimed invitation can be acted on by its intended recipient.

• J. L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason: the original book, whose language of reasonable nonbelief should be read alongside its account of divine love.
• J. L. Schellenberg, “Précis,” author-hosted version: a retrospective explanation of the original argument and its later changes.
• J. L. Schellenberg, “What Divine Hiddenness Reveals”: an accessible presentation with responses to freedom and greater-good objections.
• Jeffrey Jordan, “The Sounds of Silence”, followed by Schellenberg's reply: the dispute over belief, acceptance, and free religious commitment.