Human nature and goodness › A standard is not a head count

Suppose a garden has many plants suffering from a shortage of water. Their poor condition does not become good merely because it is common in that garden. Conversely, an unusual individual does not become defective merely because it differs from its neighbors. Frequency and evaluation answer different questions.

The point matters when moving to human life. A survey could show that a certain dishonest practice is common. That result would not by itself show that dishonesty is good for human beings. An account of what people often do is not yet an account of what they need or what makes their conduct good.

Foot's naturalism therefore calls for more than collecting behavioral regularities. The question concerns the connection between a characteristic and the life in which it has a place. This also creates a burden for the argument: the writer cannot simply call a favored habit natural and regard its value as established. The account must explain why the habit matters.

This distinction leaves room for criticism of convention. An established arrangement can be familiar and still frustrate human needs. Describing an arrangement's long history does not show that the people living under it are treated well. Natural evaluation, as Foot conceives it, is meant to supply a basis for examining such arrangements, rather than a reason to approve everything inherited.