Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals › Objections and Responses

Hume's sentimentalism has faced powerful criticisms over the centuries. _The relativism objection._ If morality is based on sentiment, and sentiments vary across cultures and individuals, doesn't this make morality relative? What's wrong for me might be right for you, depending on how we feel. Hume's response: Human nature is remarkably uniform. We share the same basic psychological constitution, the same capacity for sympathy, the same tendency to approve of useful and agreeable qualities. Variations exist, but they are variations on a common theme. Moreover, many apparent moral disagreements are really factual disagreements: we agree that we should help others flourish but disagree about what flourishing requires. Critics note, however, that this response may underestimate the depth of genuine moral disagreement across cultures and historical periods. _The motivation objection._ Hume claims reason cannot motivate action. But surely we sometimes act on purely rational considerations, overriding our feelings because we recognize what's right. Hume's response: Look more carefully at these cases. When you override a present desire for the sake of future benefit, you are not acting on pure reason. You are acting on a desire for future benefit that happens to be stronger than the present desire. Reason helps you see the consequences; sentiment provides the caring. Even the most "rational" action is ultimately motivated by some passion. This remains one of the most contested points in moral psychology, with Kantians arguing that practical reason can motivate independently of desire. _The authority objection._ If morality is just a matter of sentiment, what gives it authority over us? Why should I care about what produces approval in others? This is perhaps the deepest challenge. Hume's answer is that morality has no authority beyond the sentiments themselves. If you genuinely lack the moral sentiments, if you feel no sympathy for others and no approval of virtue, then morality has no grip on you. But such people are rare and typically recognized as pathological. For the rest of us, the sentiments are simply there, part of our constitution, shaping our responses whether we like it or not. Many philosophers find this answer unsatisfying, arguing that it fails to capture the distinctive normativity of moral claims.