Faith and ethical judgment › Teleological suspension of the ethical

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20262 min read
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Part 4 of 12Faith and Reason
Chapter 45Faith and ethical judgment › Teleological suspension of the ethical
Reading section 8 of 12 · Teleological suspension of the ethical · 2 minSection 8 of 12 · 2 min

Section 8 of 12 · 2 min read

Faith and ethical judgment › Teleological suspension of the ethicalSection view · Sections in this chapter8 / 12 ↓

Teleological refers to a purpose or end, a telos. A teleological suspension of the ethical would set the ethical in relation to a higher end rather than treat it as the final authority. In Problem I, Johannes asks whether this is what must be admitted if Abraham is to be praised as a person of faith.

His formulation is deliberately difficult: the single individual stands higher than the universal through an absolute relation to the absolute. This individual has first been subordinated to the universal and, in Johannes's formulation, becomes higher through it. Here the absolute concerns God. The claim is not that the individual's desires outrank everyone else's obligations. It is that the religious relation, if genuine, cannot receive its ultimate justification from the ethical universal.

The conditional matters. Johannes repeatedly presents a stark alternative: either Abraham's religious standing involves this paradox, or the ethical description of the deed is not overcome. A reader who rejects the suspension can consequently reject the religious justification. Understanding the argument does not require accepting its most disturbing possibility.

Suspension also differs from abolishing ethics for everyone. The father still loves Isaac, and the ethical demand still has force. That continuing demand helps explain why Johannes speaks of anguish and temptation. If Abraham's relation to Isaac ceased to matter, there would be no conflict of this kind.

Problem II examines the related question of an absolute duty to God. The issue is whether duties are ultimately expressed through shared ethical obligations or whether there can be a direct relation that places those obligations in a different position. The argument pushes toward the same problem of justification: what could make the claim intelligible to someone outside that relation?

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