Locke's Two Treatises of Government › Objections and Responses

_Objection 1: Did anyone actually consent?_ The most persistent criticism of social contract theory is simple: the original contract never happened. No one alive today signed anything. How can we be bound by an agreement we never made? Locke distinguishes express consent (explicit agreement) from tacit consent. Those who explicitly join a political community are clearly bound. But even those who merely enjoy the benefits of society, traveling on public roads or owning property protected by law, give tacit consent to the government that provides these benefits. Critics find this response inadequate. Tacit consent seems too easy to attribute. Does someone born into a society with no realistic option to leave really consent? Can mere residence count as agreement to whatever the government does? These questions remain contested. _Objection 2: Does labor really create property rights?_ Locke's labor theory of property faces several challenges. Why should mixing labor with something make it yours rather than simply losing your labor? If I pour my can of tomato juice into the ocean, do I own the ocean or have I just wasted my tomato juice? More seriously, the provisos that limit appropriation may be impossible to satisfy in a world of scarcity. There is no longer "enough, and as good" land for everyone. Does this mean all current property holdings are illegitimate? Or do the provisos only apply to initial acquisition, not to subsequent transfers? Defenders argue that Locke's theory captures something important about the moral significance of labor, even if the details need refinement. Critics argue that property rights require social conventions and cannot be grounded in nature alone. _Objection 3: Is the theory too individualistic?_ Communitarian critics argue that Locke's emphasis on individual rights neglects how social human beings really are. We are not isolated atoms who choose to form society. We are born into communities that shape who we are. The social contract picture distorts this reality. Locke might respond that the state of nature is not meant as anthropology. It is a way of identifying what we owe each other as human beings, apart from any particular social arrangement. Just because we are always embedded in communities does not mean those communities can do whatever they want to us. _Objection 4: Does Locke's theory justify colonialism?_ Locke's labor theory of property was used historically to justify European appropriation of indigenous lands. If land that is not cultivated in European fashion is not truly "owned," then colonizers who cultivate it might claim legitimate title. Locke himself was involved in colonial administration, serving as secretary to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina and helping draft the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina. This criticism has generated substantial scholarly attention. Some argue that Locke's theory, properly understood, does not support colonial appropriation because indigenous peoples did labor on and cultivate their lands, just not in ways European observers recognized. Others argue that the theory's logic, whatever Locke's intentions, lends itself to justifying dispossession. Still others focus on Locke's personal involvement in colonial enterprises as evidence of how he understood his own theory. The debate continues, raising important questions about how we should read historical texts whose authors held views we now find troubling.