Freedom and the problem of evil › A defense and a theodicy have different aims

A theodicy attempts to identify God's actual reasons for permitting evil. A defense, in Plantinga's use, offers a possible account sufficient to answer an allegation of inconsistency. Its proposed account need not be established as the history of our world. It must nevertheless be possible and compatible with the divine attributes under discussion.

This difference matters when evaluating a hypothetical explanation. Saying that a valuable form of freedom might provide a morally sufficient reason for permitting some wrongdoing does not establish that freedom explains a particular murder. It also does not establish that every consequence of a free choice must remain unprevented. The abstract compatibility question and the justification of particular harms require different arguments.

The defense thus makes a more limited demand than proving God's existence. A consistent set of beliefs can still be false. Likewise, a possible explanation can fail to be the actual explanation. Someone can accept Plantinga's logical distinction while remaining an atheist, and someone who believes in God can accept it while rejecting a proposed theodicy.

The limitation is part of the argument's content. It prevents the reader from treating a modal conclusion, about what could be the case, as a report about what is the case. It also prevents a logical discussion from pretending to supply the understanding someone seeks in grief. Those questions can be connected without being interchangeable.