Warrant and religious belief › Basic belief does not mean unsupported whim

A basic belief is one a person does not hold on the evidential basis of other beliefs. A properly basic belief is appropriately held in that way with respect to the epistemic property under discussion. Plantinga distinguishes questions about justification, rationality, and warrant; the phrase needs that qualification.

The breakfast example illustrates the difference between a ground and an inference. Remembering can occasion a belief without the person first accepting premises about the reliability of memory. Likewise, a visual experience can give rise to belief in a nearby tree without a silently rehearsed argument. Being noninferential does not mean arising in a psychological vacuum.

The same distinction applies to the proposed religious case. Plantinga does not argue that beliefs become warranted whenever someone declares them basic. A belief could be basic and produced by wishful thinking. Its classification as basic tells us about its relation to other beliefs; it does not establish proper function, a suitable environment, or truth-directed success.

Nor does Plantinga's argument require saying that arguments for God have no value. An argument could support a believer's understanding, answer an objection, or convince someone else. The issue is whether that kind of argument is a necessary source of warrant for every believer. The model proposes that it is not.