Evidence and a cumulative case for God › Religious experience and testimony

Swinburne's case includes religious experience. He defends a principle of credulity: in the absence of counterevidence, things probably are as they seem to a subject in experience. He also defends a principle of testimony, giving reports of others a presumption of credibility in the absence of reasons for doubt.

These principles do not say that every apparent encounter is veridical or that every report is trustworthy. Their qualifications matter. A reason to suspect deception, impairment, or a misleading setting can change an assessment. The proposed application to religious experience must therefore consider defeaters rather than count reports as unqualified confirmations.

There is also a difference between an experience's force for the person having it and its evidential force for someone hearing about it. The second person receives testimony, with questions about what was experienced and how accurately it is reported. Identifying those stages helps avoid treating personal assurance as automatically transferable public evidence.

Religious diversity creates another question for the cumulative case. If reports support incompatible interpretations, an assessment must consider what they have in common and where their apparent content conflicts. The mere existence of many reports would not by itself determine which interpretation is correct. Swinburne's principles establish a proposed starting policy for assessment, not an exemption from comparison.