Natural theology and natural law › Unjust law and the limits of a slogan

In I-II, question 96, article 4, Aquinas says unjust laws can be acts of violence rather than laws in the full sense. He discusses injustice through a law's end, its author, or the unequal distribution of burdens. This is a moral assessment of authority and obligation, not merely a prediction about what a court will enforce.

He also qualifies the consequences. Laws contrary to human good ordinarily do not bind conscience, though compliance may be required to avoid scandal or disturbance. Laws contrary to divine good must not be obeyed. Saying simply that every unjust law may always be disregarded would omit these conditions.

A contemporary hypothetical case can use the distinction without claiming Aquinas judged it himself. Imagine a rule that distributes a community burden solely to enrich its ruler. Asking whether it was enacted through the proper procedure would not exhaust the moral question. One would also need to examine its end, the authority involved, and the distribution of the burden.

This example does not authorize a legal conclusion about a particular modern statute. It illustrates the philosophical difference between an enactment's procedural status and its claim to bind conscience. Applying that difference responsibly requires reasons about the actual circumstances, including the consequences of disobedience.