True belief and epistemic luck › Further reading
Michael BrenndoerferUpdated August 10, 20261 min read
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True belief and epistemic luck › Further readingSection view · Sections in this chapter9 / 9 ↓
Sections in this chapter9
- Edmund L. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", Analysis 23.6 (1963), pp.121–123. Read the two preliminary assumptions and both cases together; the journal-page scan allows comparison with the transcription.
- Alvin I. Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing", The Journal of Philosophy 64.12 (1967), pp.357–372. An early primary response, explicitly scoped to empirical knowledge.
- Linda Zagzebski, "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems", The Philosophical Quarterly 44.174 (1994), pp.65–73. A later paper on Gettier problems; the publisher page supplies bibliographic information, with full access subject to availability.
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