Freedom and practical reason › Autonomy and heteronomy

Autonomy means that the will legislates through reason. It does not mean making a rule valid merely because I choose it. A self-chosen principle of deception would not acquire moral authority from the fact that it expressed my personal priorities. The requirement of universal legislation constrains what self-legislation can mean.

Heteronomy makes the will depend for its determining ground on an object of desire. Acting honestly solely because I expect a payment differs from acting honestly because the principle is required. The same outward conduct can therefore have different moral explanations.

The distinction does not require a person to become indifferent to every human concern. Someone can enjoy helping another person and also recognize a duty to help. The presence of a welcome feeling does not by itself establish that inclination is the determining ground of the will.

Conversely, difficulty does not establish moral worth. An unpleasant task could serve a vicious end. What matters is the principle and determining ground, not how much the person suffers while acting. Costly action can reveal the tension between inclination and duty, but suffering is not a substitute for a defensible moral reason.