Choosing a way of life › Choosing oneself does not mean inventing oneself

The judge's language of choosing oneself can initially sound like a demand to select a more attractive personality. His account is more difficult. The self to be chosen already exists, yet takes on a different character through being chosen. He explicitly distinguishes this from creating oneself out of nothing.

The person cannot simply erase the history from which they begin. The judge links self-choice with continuity. He also makes repentance central to acknowledging oneself. Taking responsibility includes a relation to what one has been, rather than selecting only the flattering parts of a personal history.

Repentance therefore has more force than regretting an inconvenient outcome. Within the judge's religiously informed argument, the person acknowledges guilt before God. This prevents treating his ethical standpoint as wholly secular willpower. Religious commitments are already present within the letters, before the concluding sermon appears.

The distinction also limits a modern application. Someone can acknowledge an inherited situation without declaring every feature of it good. Responsible acceptance of a starting point is not identical with approving every injustice connected to it. What should be revised remains a question requiring substantive judgment.