Choosing a way of life › Marriage and the work of continuity

Marriage is a central example in the judge's defense of the ethical. He argues for its aesthetic validity rather than accepting that commitment necessarily destroys love's value. In his account, married love has its conflict and development within time. Duration can belong to the achievement of love, rather than simply wearing it away.

The relation to duty is equally important. The judge refuses to reduce the duty of love to a catalogue of outward etiquette. Its demand concerns truly loving. Observing externally enforceable rules would not by itself establish that a person has fulfilled the responsibility of a spouse.

This is a demanding claim rather than an easy celebration of respectability. The person must make universal duty concrete as their own duty. In the judge's account, becoming ethical involves more than copying a socially approved exterior. The letters ask how responsibility can become internal to the person's activity.

His marriage example still needs critical examination. A reader can question whether his account gives adequate attention to unequal power within a relationship. A commitment's duration does not by itself establish its justice. Applying the argument responsibly requires keeping the question of what is owed to another person open.

It would also be a mistake to infer that remaining in every existing arrangement is the ethical answer. Consistency with a past decision can conflict with recognizing a present wrong. Deciding whether revision is justified requires reasons about the relationship itself. The distinction between commitment and drift cannot decide every such case in advance.

A hypothetical friendship helps expose this difficulty. Suppose two friends have promised to care for one another, but disagree about what that care requires after circumstances change. Keeping the promise may involve an uncomfortable conversation rather than repeating the same familiar gestures. The responsibility concerns the person to whom the promise was made, not only the promisor's preferred picture of being dependable. Revision and continuity are therefore not always opposites. A change in conduct may express an attempt to honor a commitment more truthfully.

This illustration is an application of the chapter's distinction, rather than a case discussed by the judge. It does not establish which friend is right. It supplies a reason to distinguish responsibility from mere behavioral repetition. An ethical assessment would still need to examine the actual promise, the circumstances of the disagreement and the other person's claims. Calling either response committed cannot replace that examination.