Virtue, practices, and traditions › A practice has something worth learning

MacIntyre uses practice in a restricted sense. It does not mean any repeated behavior or any task performed skillfully. His examples include chess, architecture, farming, scientific inquiry, painting, and music. These activities involve socially established cooperation and standards of excellence through which participants can develop their abilities and their understanding of what is valuable (chapter 14).

The distinction matters for learning. Someone entering a practice cannot make personal satisfaction the sole measure of achievement. A novice musician may enjoy a performance while failing to hear problems that experienced performers recognize. Learning involves allowing an established standard to correct that initial judgment. Yet the standards are not simply frozen: accomplished practitioners can extend what the activity makes possible.

This does not make every skilled action a practice. MacIntyre distinguishes bricklaying from architecture and planting turnips from farming. The narrower task can contribute to the more complex activity without containing its whole range of goods and standards. The distinction also raises a question for his account: how do we decide which activities qualify, and who gets authority to describe their goods?