Virtue, practices, and traditions › Internal goods and the child learning chess

An activity can bring rewards available through other activities. Money and prestige are examples of external goods. Their connection to a particular practice is contingent: someone can obtain money without becoming a good chess player. Internal goods are distinctive achievements whose character becomes intelligible through participating in the relevant practice. Understanding what makes a chess position interesting requires more than knowing who received a prize.

MacIntyre illustrates this distinction with a child who initially wants candy rather than chess. The promised reward gives the child a reason to play. If the reward remains the only aim, cheating may appear attractive whenever it can go undetected. But the child can come to value the analytical skill and imagination involved in playing well. Cheating then defeats something the child has learned to care about. The example describes a possible transformation in motivation, rather than a guarantee about how children learn.

A victory and an excellent performance consequently need not coincide. This does not mean that competition has no place in a practice: players can test and develop their abilities through it. The distinction is between achieving a result and achieving the goods that make the particular activity worth learning. An observer who sees only wins may miss the difference.

MacIntyre's account also gives internal goods a shared dimension. Excellence can enlarge what others in the practice recognize and attempt. External goods, by contrast, characteristically become someone's possessions and can become objects of competition. This is a distinction in his argument about the goods, not a claim that every accomplishment immediately benefits every participant equally.