Reason, scripture, and the limits of language › Creation shows why proof matters

The discussion of the world's origin prevents us from treating interpretation as an automatic solution to every difficulty. In Part II, chapter 25, Maimonides compares the status of divine incorporeality with the status of the world's eternity. He regards incorporeality as demonstrated. He does not regard Aristotle's account of eternity as demonstrated.

The difference governs his treatment of scripture. A passage whose bodily reading conflicts with a demonstrated conclusion must be interpreted otherwise. A merely plausible argument for eternity does not have the same authority. Maimonides says that the biblical language of creation could be interpreted differently if the philosophical situation required it; the language alone is not the decisive obstacle.

He also identifies a substantive religious problem with the Aristotelian position as he understands it. Its necessary order would exclude the miracles and divine choices central to the law. His objection is therefore more than a preference for an uncomplicated reading of Genesis. The issue concerns what kind of divine action the account permits.

It would be equally misleading to say that Maimonides demonstrates creation from nothing in this chapter. He explicitly treats the accepted scriptural teaching as a truth for which he lacks that demonstration. He distinguishes the authority of religious commitment from the status of a philosophical proof, rather than pretending they are interchangeable.

This passage supplies a demanding standard for interpretation. A reader must establish the strength of the argument that supposedly requires a new reading. Neither unease about a passage nor admiration for a philosopher is enough. The proposed interpretation must respond to an actual intellectual reason, and the reason's limits must remain visible.