Reason, scripture, and the limits of language › Divine actions and human emotions

Maimonides distinguishes knowledge of God's essence from descriptions of divine actions. Part I, chapter 54 develops this distinction through Moses's request to know God's ways. On Maimonides's reading, Moses can learn the order and governance of created things without perceiving the divine essence.

Words such as merciful can describe the character of an action as it appears in that order. A human being might preserve and care for another because of an emotional disposition. Describing a divine action as merciful need not attribute that human emotion to God. The similarity concerns the action or its effects, rather than an identical inner psychological process.

This prevents a common overstatement of negative theology. Maimonides does not say that religious language must cease to distinguish care from harm, or order from disorder. He distinguishes the kinds of claims those descriptions support. An account of what an action does is not automatically an account of the essence or emotional condition of its agent.

The distinction also links theology to conduct. In chapter 54, Moses's wish to know God's ways concerns governing the people. Understanding actions can guide human action. We can ask what it would mean to act with justice or mercy without assuming that God experiences the passions through which people sometimes perform those actions.

A possible objection remains. Can a relationship of prayer or love survive such limits on personal language? The question follows from the argument; it need not be assigned to a historical critic without evidence. A defender can point to Maimonides's descriptions of knowledge, love, and action elsewhere in the Guide. The reader still has to decide whether those descriptions preserve what religious relationship requires.