Belief, uncertainty, and commitment › Why diversion matters

In fragment 139 Pascal considers activities that keep people occupied: hunting, games, warfare, and ambitious pursuits. He asks why someone might prefer the effort of obtaining something to possessing it peacefully. His answer is that the activity itself supplies relief from reflection on a vulnerable and mortal condition. He calls this diversion.

Diversion is broader than amusement. A serious pursuit can perform the same function as a game if its urgency prevents someone from confronting an unwelcome question. Conversely, calling something enjoyable does not establish that it is an evasion. Pascal's diagnosis concerns the relation between an activity and what its participant is avoiding.

Consider a hypothetical person who devotes every free evening to preparing for a competition. The preparation may develop skill, sustain friendship, or bring pleasure. Suppose, however, that the person finds the prospect of an unoccupied evening intolerable and immediately replaces one contest with another. Pascal would ask whether the chase has become a way of avoiding thought about a life beyond the next result. The example makes his question concrete; it does not establish that competition or ambition is generally empty.

The diagnosis is demanding because the person can want the stated prize. Pascal thinks we can misunderstand the role that wanting plays in our lives. Someone may believe that winning will finally bring rest while repeatedly creating another contest after winning. His account tries to explain that pattern by looking at the relief supplied by pursuit itself.

A limitation belongs close to this proposal. People can remain active for reasons that have nothing to do with evasion, including responsibilities to others. A person's discomfort with inactivity also does not establish Pascal's Christian explanation. His description invites examination of particular motives; its broad account of humanity needs further defense.