Learning and inquiry › True Opinions Before Knowledge
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Learning and inquiry › True Opinions Before KnowledgeSection view · Sections in this chapter5 / 10 ↓
Socrates draws an intermediate conclusion: someone who lacks knowledge can nevertheless have true opinions about the matter. He describes the boy's present opinions as dreamlike and says that repeated questioning in different ways would turn them into knowledge (85b–d). The boy has not yet attained the settled understanding that the dialogue distinguishes from getting the answer right.
Socrates then argues that, since the boy was not taught these truths in his present life, he must have acquired them at another time. This takes the argument toward the soul's prior existence and immortality (85d–86b). That inference depends on accepting that the questions have recovered previously acquired knowledge. The demonstration alone does not force that explanation: a critic can instead understand the exchange as reasoning from familiar concepts with extensive help.
Socrates also qualifies his confidence. At 86b–c he does not insist on every part of his account, but he strongly defends the claim that believing inquiry worthwhile makes us more willing to seek than accepting its impossibility. His caution should prevent us from presenting the whole scene as a settled proof of prenatal knowledge. His argument should also prevent us from dismissing recollection as decorative language with no metaphysical commitment.
The boy's correct opinions can become knowledge through further questioning, according to Socrates. The distinction allows progress between complete ignorance and knowledge, even before we decide whether recollection explains that progress.
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