Being, difference, and falsehood › Finding the sophist by division

At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates asks how the sophist, statesman, and philosopher differ. These are the objects of inquiry, rather than three identified professionals taking turns in the conversation. The principal discussion proceeds between Theaetetus and an unnamed visitor from Elea, introduced as associated with Parmenides and Zeno. Socrates initiates the question but does not conduct the main investigation (Sophist 216a–218b).

The visitor insists that sharing a name does not establish that two people understand the same thing. They need an account of what the sophist is. Before attempting this difficult definition, they practise on the angler. Starting from the broad category of expertise, they distinguish productive activities from acquisitive ones, then follow narrower divisions until they identify the angler's particular way of catching fish. The exercise makes a definition answerable to explicit distinctions rather than an impression (Sophist 218b–221c).

Applied to the sophist, the method produces several descriptions. He appears as a paid hunter of wealthy young people, a trader in teachings, and a competitive disputant. Another route describes someone who removes a person's conceit of knowledge through refutation. The visitor handles this last comparison cautiously: the beneficial practice of intellectual purification must not be confused too quickly with its deceptive relative. His comparison between a dog and a wolf warns that resemblance can conceal a consequential difference (Sophist 230b–231b).

This creates an objection to the method itself. A classification can reflect the classifier's suspicion. Calling a teacher a hunter already encourages us to picture the student as prey. As readers, we should ask what each proposed description establishes and what it merely suggests. The dialogue's repeated definitions make that question possible; a single memorable insult would not do the same work.

The investigation eventually concentrates on apparent expertise. Someone who seems able to dispute successfully about everything need not know everything. The visitor compares this display with a painter's capacity to produce images of many things without producing those things themselves. A verbal imitation of expertise can likewise impress an audience that lacks the relevant knowledge (Sophist 232b–234e).