Justification to other people › Scope, dependence and difficult cases

The question of who is owed justification is especially important for those unable to articulate a complaint. Scanlon discusses the scope of his account and distinguishes it from the broader range of moral values. We should not infer from a creature's inability to reason with us that its suffering has no moral importance.

Nor should we assume that extending the interpersonal model to every moral question is straightforward. Relations with future people, dependent people and nonhuman animals raise questions about representation and the basis of standing. The framework must address those questions explicitly. Calling contractualism inclusive would not establish a particular answer.

The same care applies when using the view to assess institutions. An organization might offer affected people a forum to object yet ignore their strongest reasons. Hearing objections is useful, but actual participation does not establish that the governing principle is justifiable. We need an assessment of the principle and its alternatives, rather than a record that consultation occurred.

These are applications and tests of the theory. They are not evidence that Scanlon supplied a complete decision procedure for every institutional or personal dilemma. The philosophical subject remains the reasons people can press against standards governing how they are treated.