Justification to other people › The contractualist formula

For the part of morality at issue, Scanlon's formula says that an act is wrong if every principle permitting it could reasonably be rejected by people seeking principles that others could not reasonably reject. The quantifier matters. Finding one objectionable principle that permits an act does not prove that the act is wrong; a different, more carefully qualified principle might permit it without being reasonably rejectable.

Think about a principle allowing promises to be broken whenever convenient. Someone might reasonably reject that principle while accepting one allowing departure when keeping the promise would prevent an urgent rescue. Both principles permit some promise breaking. We need to determine whether a defensible principle permits the particular act in the particular circumstances.

Principles are general standards governing conduct and deliberation. They are not descriptions tailored to name the person we want to favor. A purported principle saying that this individual may abandon this commitment because they would enjoy doing something else would need a defense of its exceptions. Merely placing an exception inside a sentence called a principle does not justify it.

Nor is the test a poll. Many people may accept a principle because they lack information or have learned not to complain. Others may reject a defensible principle because it blocks an unfair advantage. Actual acceptance and reasonable acceptability are different. The moral work is in examining the reasons, rather than converting responses into a vote.

The formula therefore does not make a person's objection automatically decisive. Everyone's standpoint deserves consideration, but not every consideration provides a reasonable ground for rejection. A demand to exploit someone else's vulnerability cannot gain authority simply because the exploiter would be disappointed by a prohibition.