Desire and dissatisfaction › Why getting what we want can leave us wanting

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated March 30, 20261 min read
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Part 3 of 12Freedom, Meaning, and Mortality
Chapter 34Desire and dissatisfaction › Why getting what we want can leave us wanting
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A longed-for achievement can bring relief without ending the need to achieve. Imagine someone who finally completes a demanding piece of music, enjoys the performance, and soon feels drawn toward a harder one. The example does not show that achievement is worthless. It makes a distinction visible: satisfying a particular desire need not satisfy the activity of desiring.

Schopenhauer makes that distinction central to The World as Will and Representation. He argues that wanting expresses something deeper than the individual's changing goals. What appears outwardly as a world of objects can also be understood through the striving we experience in our own bodies. His name for that inner nature is will.

His conclusion goes much further than the example warrants on its own. He treats striving as basic to reality and suffering as inseparable from it. To understand the pessimism, we need to follow the argument from knowing a world, through experiencing a body, to the claim that fulfillment cannot finally settle existence. We also need to ask where those transitions require more than Schopenhauer has established.

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