Suspending judgment › Inquiry That Remains Open
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The opening of the Outlines separates three outcomes of investigation. A person may find what was sought, declare it beyond discovery, or continue searching. Sextus associates dogmatists with the first outcome, certain Academic philosophers with the second, and skeptics with the third. This is his classification of the positions, not a neutral verdict on everything the rival schools held (I.1–4).
That opening rules out a common misunderstanding. The Pyrrhonist does not announce that nothing can be known. Such a declaration would itself settle a philosophical question. Nor does Sextus describe skepticism as giving up inquiry for the sake of comfort. Its investigative character belongs to his account from the outset. At I.7 he also explains the name Pyrrhonian by reference to Pyrrho's conspicuous practice of skepticism, alongside names emphasizing investigation, suspension, and perplexity.
Sextus qualifies his own exposition too. He reports how matters appear to him at present rather than asserting that their reality must correspond to his account. That qualification applies to the skeptical account itself. It creates a challenge for the reader: how can someone explain a philosophical practice without turning that explanation into another doctrine? His answers concern the use of arguments and the status of the claims he makes with them.
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