The problem with moral obligation › From injustice to virtue

Anscombe proposes using more specific concepts, such as injustice, instead of relying on a general verdict of moral wrongness. That directs attention to what a person does and the kind of defect involved. Calling something unjust says more about its character than merely adding emphatic disapproval.

However, the positive argument is not complete when the specific label has been applied. Explaining why injustice is bad involves understanding justice as a virtue. Anscombe says this requires an account of what a virtue is and how it relates to the actions in which it is exhibited.

She connects the further task with human flourishing. An adequate account would explain the kind of characteristic a virtue is and why a human being needs it. That is a demanding philosophical project, not simply a list of traits we happen to admire.

Consider an original example of a person who refuses to cheat a neighbor. We can ask what would make the cheating unjust, what the refusal expresses about the person's character, and how such character belongs to living well. The example identifies connected questions; it does not prove that every honest action benefits the agent immediately.

The unfinished character of this inquiry matters. Anscombe's appeal to flourishing should not be treated as an already demonstrated formula that makes every virtue profitable. The relation between acting justly and doing well as a human being is precisely something she says needs explanation.