The problem with moral obligation › What kind of "ought" is under criticism?
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The problem with moral obligation › What kind of "ought" is under criticism?Section view · Sections in this chapter2 / 12 ↓
Anscombe distinguishes ordinary uses of "ought" from a special moral use. A machine ought to be oiled if it needs oil to run properly. A plant needs conditions in which it can grow. Such statements connect what is needed with an activity or a kind of thing.
The moral use she targets carries a different emphasis. It presents something like an absolute verdict of guilty or not guilty concerning an action. This is the sense she connects with obligation and law. It is therefore inaccurate to read her as proposing the elimination of every sentence containing "should" or "ought."
As an original illustration, someone might say that a musician ought to slow down while learning a difficult passage. The advice connects a proposed action with learning to play accurately. That statement does not automatically claim the special law-like authority Anscombe is criticizing.
Keeping the uses separate also answers a simple apparent contradiction. Her recommendation that philosophers ought to change their vocabulary need not employ the very special moral sense she proposes abandoning. A recommendation about how to conduct inquiry can be intelligible without asserting a divine-law verdict.
Anscombe targets a special use that presents an action as required or forbidden with the force of a law-like moral verdict. Her criticism does not apply indiscriminately to ordinary statements about needs, purposes, or what is good for something.
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