The problem with moral obligation › Why action descriptions matter

Anscombe repeatedly asks how an action is being described. The same event can fall under different descriptions, and an ethical theory needs to identify which descriptions are relevant. Simply supplying a test for "an action" leaves a problem if the content of the action has not been specified.

She raises this concern in criticizing both Kant and Mill. Her objection is that their proposed methods require an account of the descriptions under which an action is considered. Without that account, the same conduct can appear under descriptions that lead the method in different directions.

Consider an original hypothetical example. A person transfers money out of an account. We might describe the movement as entering a number, making a payment, returning a debt, or taking money without authorization. Those descriptions are not interchangeable for ethical assessment.

The example does not imply that an agent can make theft acceptable by selecting a flattering description. Some descriptions are false or omit morally relevant features. The task is to determine what the person is doing and why, rather than allowing vocabulary alone to settle the evaluation.

This is part of why conceptual psychology comes first in Anscombe's proposed inquiry. Questions about intention and motive affect the action being evaluated. They cannot safely be treated as decorative additions after a theory has already assigned its verdict.