The problem with moral obligation › Three theses, rather than one slogan

If someone says that an action is "morally wrong," what has that phrase added? They may already have described the action as dishonest, cruel, or unjust. The additional verdict can sound like the announcement of a law that binds regardless of anyone's wishes. G.E.M. Anscombe asks what gives that particular use of moral language its sense.

Her essay "Modern Moral Philosophy," published in Philosophy in January 1958, challenges the continued use of obligation language after the loss of its earlier framework. But that challenge is only one part of the paper. She also calls for a better account of action and intention, and criticizes a way of judging actions that makes their consequences decisive.

Reading the essay through those connected concerns prevents a misleading summary. Anscombe does not simply replace rules with admirable character traits. She asks what actions are, how we describe them, and what would explain the relationship between virtue and human flourishing. Her proposed redirection leaves substantial philosophical work to do.

Anscombe opens with three theses. First, she proposes setting moral philosophy aside until there is an adequate philosophy of psychology. Second, she recommends abandoning the special moral concepts of obligation, duty, right and wrong, and moral "ought," if doing so is psychologically possible. Third, she says the differences between the well-known English moral philosophers from Sidgwick onward are of little importance.

The last claim is deliberately sweeping. Its point is not that these philosophers use identical arguments or agree about every action. Anscombe thinks a shared development in their treatment of responsibility and consequences matters more than their differences. A reader needs to examine that specific criticism before accepting her verdict on the tradition.

Likewise, her first thesis does not say that we should wait for a laboratory discovery before thinking about conduct. The missing psychology includes conceptual questions about action, intention, wanting, and pleasure. Without an adequate account of these, a theory can use familiar words while failing to explain what its evaluations concern.

These theses constrain the positive interpretation of the essay. If the conceptual groundwork is still missing, it would be inconsistent to present the paper as a completed alternative ethical system. Anscombe supplies criticisms, examples, and a direction of inquiry; she does not finish the account she asks for.