Conflicting duties › Beneficence and self-improvement

Beneficence concerns improving the condition of others. Ross discusses improvement in virtue, intelligence or knowledge, and pleasure. The category therefore has a broader object than satisfying a momentary preference. His account of good is not limited to a single kind of pleasant experience.

Self-improvement concerns the agent's own virtue and intellectual capacities. Its presence in the inventory is significant: deliberation about duty need not consider the agent only as a resource for improving other people's lives. There can also be a claim to develop one's own character or understanding.

These concerns can compete for time. Suppose an evening could be spent fulfilling a commitment to teach someone or working on your own education. Both activities can have value, but their value alone does not determine the verdict. An existing undertaking may supply a further reason to teach; the urgency of the educational opportunity may matter as well.

The example is an application of the distinctions, not a result Ross derives for every such choice. It illustrates why the inventory should lead to more attentive description. Saying "self-improvement" does not convert any personally attractive project into a duty, just as saying "beneficence" does not excuse ignoring what another person is actually owed.