Conflicting duties › Duty proper and the whole situation

Michael BrenndoerferNovember 1, 20261 min read
PhilosophyAll chapters
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Part 2 of 12Moral Reasons
Chapter 18Conflicting duties › Duty proper and the whole situation
Reading section 3 of 14 · Duty proper and the whole situation · 1 minSection 3 of 14 · 1 min

Section 3 of 14 · 1 min read

Conflicting duties › Duty proper and the whole situationSection view · Sections in this chapter3 / 14 ↓

An actual duty, or duty proper, is what the agent ought to do in the circumstances taken together. Identifying it requires attention to all the relevant claims. Merely naming a prima facie duty does not establish that it governs the case.

For the opening example, suppose the emergency really is urgent, the agent can help, and no one else can provide the needed assistance. These conditions matter. If the person is already receiving adequate help, or if the agent's presence would add little, the reason for abandoning the promise may be weaker.

Likewise, the promise's circumstances matter. Was the friend depending on this particular person to transport essential belongings? Can the move be delayed? Can another helper be found? Describing the conflict as "promise versus emergency" is a beginning, not a completed judgment.

Ross's view is demanding in this respect. An agent must study the situation and form a considered opinion about which claim is most incumbent. The account does not make moral judgment arbitrary, but it denies that certainty about general duties automatically supplies certainty about the particular act required.

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