Conflicting duties › Knowing a principle and judging a case

Knowing that promises have moral force does not reveal everything about a particular promise. The agent might misunderstand its terms, fail to see another person's reliance, or overestimate the benefit of an alternative. More information can change the judgment without making fidelity disappear from the theory.

Ross treats judgments of particular duty as matters of considered opinion. This does not imply that all answers are equally good. A judgment that ignores a major harm or invents a convenient excuse can be criticized for those failures. Fallibility is compatible with reasons for preferring one assessment over another.

Imagine discovering that the supposed emergency in the opening example was a misunderstanding. The ground for missing the move may then disappear. Alternatively, discovering that the friend has several other helpers could reduce the cost of absence. These are changes in what the situation gives the agent reason to do.

Careful moral judgment consequently includes a factual discipline. Before deciding which claim outweighs another, identify what each actually rests on. An account of plural duties does not relieve an agent of this work. It makes omissions visible by asking whether the situation has been reduced too quickly to one favorable description.