Conflicting duties › What self-evidence means

Ross holds that general principles of prima facie duty can be self-evident. He explicitly distinguishes this from being obvious from birth or immediately recognized on first hearing. Understanding can require sufficient maturity and attention to the proposition.

The comparison is with a truth that, once properly understood, does not require proof from something more basic. Ross thinks that reflection on the keeping of a promise can disclose its prima facie rightness. The claim concerns the ground supplied by that feature, not a guarantee that every promise must be fulfilled regardless of circumstances.

This position should not be softened into the thought that general moral principles are merely convenient guesses. Ross attributes knowledge to them. His much stronger reservation concerns particular duties. Whether this act should be done, in this whole situation, requires judgment that can fall short of certainty.

The distinction also prevents intuitionism from becoming a slogan about following a feeling. An immediate impulse may overlook relevant facts or mistake the nature of an undertaking. Ross's appeal to considered understanding places demands on reflection. Whether those demands successfully distinguish insight from prejudice is a further question for his account.