Conflicting duties › Why the right is not simply the greatest good

The title names a distinction that runs through the argument. Judging an outcome good and judging an act right are connected questions, but Ross denies that the first can always settle the second. A person's prior promise or responsibility for a wrong can make a difference beyond the value produced.

Suppose two recipients would benefit equally from assistance, but one is owed compensation for a wrong the agent committed. Equal benefit does not exhaust the moral description. The reparation claim identifies a relationship that a comparison of the resulting advantages could miss.

This is not a demonstration that every consequentialist theory must ignore relationships in practice. A consequentialist can explain why promise-keeping and compensation often produce valuable results. Ross's challenge concerns their ultimate ground: does the undertaking or wrong itself supply a claim, or does its force always depend on maximizing good?

That question also explains why moral pluralism and pluralism about good should be distinguished. Recognizing several valuable things does not itself establish several independent duties. Ross argues both that goodness has more than one object and that rightness cannot be reduced to producing the most good. The second claim needs its own defense.