What we mean by good › A real property without a natural definition

Moore's positive position is usually described as a form of non-naturalism. He takes goodness to be real and irreducible to the natural properties of the things that are good. A natural description may tell us what something is like while leaving the evaluative judgment to be made.

This position should be distinguished from the claim that goodness is a separate substance. Moore is discussing a property, not an additional object hidden inside a pleasant experience. Nor is he treating "good" as an expression that merely reports the speaker's feelings. His account takes judgments of intrinsic value to make claims that can be true or false.

His use of intuition also needs care. In the preface he explains that calling a proposition intuitive concerns its inability to be proved by inference from other propositions. It does not mean that whatever first seems right must be correct. The distinction is about the grounds of a judgment, rather than a guarantee of its psychological certainty.

That leaves a serious question for the view: how should competing judgments of intrinsic value be assessed when argument reaches this point? Moore offers careful comparison and isolation of the objects being judged. A reader may still doubt whether those methods provide enough discipline. Indefinability does not itself answer the question of reliable knowledge.