What we mean by good › What Moore thinks is worth pursuing

In chapter VI, especially section 113, Moore gives a substantive account of important goods. He places personal affection and the appreciation of beautiful objects at the center of his view. The valuable things are complex states of consciousness and their relations to their objects, rather than a bare quantity of agreeable feeling.

This is why the book should not be reduced to a prohibition on definitions. Moore wants to distinguish worthwhile ends and to explain why the relationships and experiences involved matter. His account of organic unities makes room for the character of what is loved or appreciated to affect the value of the whole.

His evaluations remain claims requiring assessment. Indefinability alone does not establish that personal affection and aesthetic appreciation are the greatest goods. A person could accept his analysis of goodness while disagreeing with his ranking of ends. Keeping those arguments separate allows us to identify where the disagreement lies.

The same caution applies to the beautiful-world comparison. In section 113 Moore treats the mere existence of beauty as much less valuable than consciousness of beauty. His thought experiment therefore should not be used to portray his final view as indifferent to experience or to human relationships.