What we mean by good › Good in itself and good as a means

After distinguishing goodness from its proposed definitions, Moore separates questions about ends from questions about means. Something can be valuable because of what it produces, or valuable for its own sake. The reasons for these judgments differ (sections 15–17).

Consider an original example: a difficult conversation might be unpleasant but help repair a friendship. Its unpleasantness and its usefulness are distinct features. Judging the conversation useful requires a view about what it is likely to bring about. Judging friendship good for its own sake asks a different question, about the value of the relationship itself.

Moore calls attention to this difference because instrumental judgments depend on causal knowledge. Whether an action promotes something valuable cannot be settled merely by knowing what goodness means. We must also understand the action's likely consequences and the alternatives available.

An intrinsic judgment is not a prediction that something will improve another outcome. Its object is the thing considered as valuable in itself. Failing to distinguish these questions can make a defense of something's usefulness appear to establish its final value, or make an objection to an action's effects appear to settle the value of its aim.

The distinction does not require means and ends to fall into permanently separate categories. The same thing can have intrinsic value and also contribute to other goods. What matters is identifying which relation a particular judgment asserts.