What we mean by good › The question left open

Moore's challenge to proposed definitions appears in section 13. Imagine a proposal that identifies goodness with being desired. A person who understands the proposal can still ask whether what is desired is good. For Moore, this question expresses a genuine doubt rather than simply asking whether the desired is desired.

The reasoning depends on a contrast between an identity of meaning and a substantive connection. If "good" meant exactly "desired," then asserting that the desired is good would add nothing beyond saying that the desired is desired. Moore thinks ethical judgments do add something. We can understand both notions while considering whether they apply together.

The same challenge can be put to pleasure. The question whether pleasure is good seems intelligible even to someone who understands pleasure perfectly well. Moore takes the continuing intelligibility of the question as evidence that goodness and pleasure are different notions. His argument is commonly called the open-question argument.

The argument concerns the content of the question, rather than the psychological fact that someone can hesitate before answering it. People can hesitate because they are confused, uninformed, or inattentive. Moore needs the stronger claim that a competent understanding of the concepts still leaves a substantive question to answer.

This is also why an example cannot establish his conclusion by itself. Showing that one proposed definition fails would leave other proposals open. Moore claims the difficulty applies to any analysis of goodness into other notions. Whether he is entitled to that generalization is part of what a reader must assess.