What we mean by good › The value of a whole

Moore adds a complication: the intrinsic value of a whole need not equal the sum of the values its parts have considered separately. He calls wholes with this kind of relationship organic unities (sections 18–22). "Organic" here concerns value, rather than whether the thing is biologically alive.

Imagine, as an illustration, an experience of understanding a work of art. We can distinguish the object, the person's awareness, and the attitude taken toward it. Moore's principle warns against evaluating these separately and assuming their total gives the value of the entire experience.

The point is not simply that parts cooperate efficiently. That would concern the effects they produce. Moore's claim is that the complex whole can have an intrinsic value that is not obtained by adding independently assigned component values. The relation between its parts belongs to what we are evaluating.

This also does not mean that every whole is better than its parts. His principle permits differences in either direction. Nor does it imply that an object changes its own intrinsic value whenever it enters a different combination. The value of the combination is a further question.

This principle matters for his treatment of pleasure. If pleasure is a constituent of a valuable experience, it does not follow that the whole experience owes all its value to pleasure. Appreciating another person, understanding something beautiful, and enjoying that appreciation can form a complex object of evaluation. Removing the other features changes what is being judged.