What we mean by good › The naturalistic fallacy

Moore calls the mistaken identification of goodness with another property the naturalistic fallacy. His targets include accounts that identify goodness with pleasure or with what occurs in nature. His criticism concerns the attempted identification, rather than the mere suggestion that pleasure or a natural condition can be good.

Suppose, as an original illustration, someone says that a pleasurable friendship is good. That judgment need not commit Moore's fallacy. It attributes goodness to something. The different proposal that "good" simply means "pleasant" attempts to explain goodness away through the other property. Moore objects to that proposal even if some pleasures really are good.

The label can mislead. Moore also criticizes attempts to derive an account of goodness from a metaphysical reality beyond the objects of natural science. Moving from a natural property to a supposedly supersensible one does not answer his question if goodness is still being identified with something different (chapter IV). His account of indefinability is broader than a prohibition on using biological vocabulary.

A related distinction concerns the inference from a description to an evaluation. Saying that a behavior occurs in nature does not, on its own, establish that it deserves approval. That example can help reveal a missing evaluative premise, but Moore's analysis is specifically about identifying goodness with another property. Treating every questionable inference about what ought to happen as an instance of his precise argument blurs the issue.

There is a further qualification. An ethical theory might identify which things are good without claiming to define goodness. A hedonist could say that pleasure alone has intrinsic value while accepting that "good" does not mean "pleasurable." Moore's objection to a definition would not, by itself, refute that substantive claim. He needs a separate argument against pleasure being the only good.