What we mean by good › From value to right action

Moore connects right action with producing the best possible results among the alternatives available. This is a consequentialist feature of his account: the moral evaluation of action depends on what results it brings about (chapter V). Rejecting a definition of goodness as pleasure does not entail rejecting consequence-based reasoning.

Knowing what ought to be done consequently raises difficulties beyond identifying intrinsic goods. We may not know the remote consequences of an action, the effects of alternative actions, or how the relevant goods and evils compare. Moore discusses the limits this places on confident particular judgments.

His treatment of familiar rules belongs to that practical problem. A rule can guide conduct because experience gives us reason to think that following it generally supports better results. That does not make the rule's authority a definition of goodness or show that we can calculate every consequence of every action.

The distinction between a standard of rightness and a usable decision procedure is helpful here. Saying that the right action has the best results states a criterion. It does not supply an agent with complete knowledge of those results. A reader should assess both Moore's criterion and his account of what limited agents can reasonably know.