Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated February 25, 202513 min read

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's 1972 critique of psychoanalysis and capitalism through 'desiring-machines' and 'deterritorialization.'

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Part 11 of 12Power, History, and Social Criticism
Chapter 136Desire and social production › Why begin with a walk?
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Why begin with a walk?

At the start of Anti-Oedipus, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari turn to Georg Büchner’s story Lenz. They compare its protagonist’s walk outdoors with the time he spends with a pastor who asks him to understand himself through religious and family relationships. While walking, Lenz encounters mountains, falling snow, and vegetation. Deleuze and Guattari attend to what the walk connects and produces. They want an account of such experiences that can start with their relations to the world. An account that begins with prescribed identities and family positions has already made a decision about where the important connections lie. Chapter I, §1, pp. 1–2.

First published in French in 1972, the book has four long chapters. It develops a theory of productive desire, applies it to the psychoanalytic tradition surrounding the Oedipus complex, proposes a comparative account of social production, and ends by introducing a practice named schizoanalysis. These projects depend on one another. If desire takes shape through interactions with bodies, tools, and institutions, a family history can be a substantial part of its explanation. But the explanation changes when family relationships are given a standing that every other relationship must borrow. Deleuze and Guattari ask what we can learn by studying the wider set of connections directly. Contents and chapter I.

Desire makes connections

The book’s opening pages give the example of a mouth and a breast. The breast supplies a flow of milk, the mouth interrupts and draws on that flow, and feeding can take place through their connection. The term desiring-machine refers at first to connections and interruptions of this kind. An organ can enter different arrangements. Mouths also breathe, speak, and make sounds. The role an organ takes on depends on what it is doing with something else in a given encounter. It is possible to describe that encounter before assigning the organ a place in an account of anybody’s intentions or family relationships. Chapter I, §1, pp. 1–7.

Calling this desire stretches the everyday meaning of the word. We ordinarily start with someone who knows what they want, or who can be asked to identify what they want. In the book, even a relatively simple connection can be part of a process through which desires and subjects take shape. The child at the breast does not have to possess a prior account of feeding or a plan for the encounter. The connection produces a pattern that can be repeated and varied. Nor is naming it a machine a claim that the event proceeds like the fixed instructions in an appliance. The machine includes the relations through which the result is produced. It can change when any of those relations changes. Chapter I, §§1 and 4, pp. 1–7 and 22–27.

The authors object to making lack the origin of desire. A person may be hungry. But the absence of food does little to explain why a particular meal, shared with these people and prepared in this way, comes to matter as it does. Shared schedules, acquired tastes, bodily activity, and habits of preparation furnish a more specific answer. The book makes the stronger claim that social arrangements can produce experienced lacks as well as producing attachments. That argument is about the order of explanation. It asks how an absence acquires its force in a particular setting and what practices and institutions help make that setting. It does not require a reader to doubt that hunger and shortages are real. Chapter I, §4, pp. 25–35.

The book refers to Richard Lindner’s painting Boy with Machine to illustrate how early a connection can reach beyond the household. Deleuze and Guattari see its boy as operating a small machine connected to a larger technical and social one. The parts of the painting offer a way of visualizing a relation between local activity and larger arrangements. Imagine a child handling a transit card. The card can be put to use with a reader, a ride, and a system of fare rules and money. Taking the bus can become part of a recurring pattern of visiting people or places. The family might provide the card or set rules for travel. The transit system makes other relations possible at the same time. The question is how these connections work together. Chapter I, §1, pp. 6–8.

Production, recording, and the subject

Deleuze and Guattari distinguish three interdependent processes, which they call syntheses. The connective synthesis concerns the coming together of partial elements and flows. The disjunctive synthesis concerns the recording and distribution of connections and their differences. The conjunctive synthesis concerns the production of a sense of being someone within this activity. It is easy to read the names as three successive stages. The later account of desiring-machines explains that the logical order of presenting them differs from how they operate together. The subject of experience can be one effect of these operations. The proposal gives less explanatory work to the assumption that a fully formed subject directs them from the outset. Chapter I, §§1–3, pp. 1–22, and chapter IV, §4, pp. 322–329.

The body without organs belongs to the same account. It is produced within desiring-production and figures as a limit to the organization of the parts. In one relation the body without organs repels the connections, which can be experienced as invasive or persecuting. In another it attracts them and becomes a surface on which their activity is recorded, so that production seems to emanate from it. This is why the text calls it an element of antiproduction while repeatedly putting it inside a process of production. Elsewhere the authors distinguish organs that take part in particular connections from the organizing unity of an organism. Their unusual term concerns what happens to those connections when the unity that typically organizes them meets resistance. Chapter I, §2, pp. 8–16, and chapter IV, §4, pp. 322–332.

Their social account has a related term, the socius. The authors apply it to the body of the earth in a territorial machine, the body of the ruler in a despotic machine, and capital under capitalism. Each is a way of conceiving what records and appropriates production. A workforce produces goods through many separate activities. In the book’s account of capitalism, capital comes to appear as the source from which the productivity flows. The analogy with the body without organs concerns how a surface of recording can appear to originate what is attributed to it. Describing a mode of social appropriation calls for more than assuming that an individual psyche is projected onto a society. Chapter I, §2, pp. 9–12, and chapter III, §1, pp. 139–144.

Three ways of organizing production

The social history of Anti-Oedipus distinguishes territorial coding, despotic overcoding, and capitalist axiomatics. In the first account, relations of kinship, alliance, debt, and land help determine how things and obligations circulate. A claim on part of a harvest has a particular meaning within such relationships. It cannot automatically transfer to someone else willing to buy it. In the despotic account, existing relations come to be organized under an additional authority, with obligations such as tribute redirected toward a ruler. Overcoding is this organization of existing codes through a higher authority. The difference matters. Lumping both cases together as traditional restrictions would conceal the mechanisms the authors use to compare them. Chapter III, §§2 and 6, pp. 145–154 and 192–200.

In the account of capitalism, a holder of money able to invest meets workers able to sell their capacity to work. The encounter presupposes historical changes in access to land, tools, money, and goods. Deleuze and Guattari call it a conjunction of decoded flows. Decoded here concerns the detachment of a flow from particular prior obligations or rules. A capacity to work that enters a labor market can be purchased by an employer with whom the worker has no inherited relationship. Capitalism organizes such flows through an axiomatic. A wage, an amount of credit, and a commodity price can enter into calculated relations. Their combination is already a form of regulation. The market in this account is one way of channeling movements that old arrangements once tied to a specific status or territory. Chapter III, §§9–10, pp. 222–249.

Deterritorialization names the loosening of ties that previously gave a practice or flow a place. Reterritorialization names its attachment to a renewed or different grounding. Imagine a workshop in which people have been assigned roles according to kinship. A shift to hiring for wages can enable someone from a different area to find a job. It can also make access to the job depend on a new set of conditions, including contract, pay, and the position of the employer in a market. The same shift can therefore open possibilities and establish dependencies. The book’s question is how these two movements occur together. Its analysis of capitalism depends on examining both the conditions that loosen inherited attachments and the arrangements that emerge around the resulting flows. Chapter III, §§9–10, pp. 222–262.

The argument is easier to use critically if we keep its level of abstraction in view. The labels are part of a theoretical reconstruction that draws extensively on anthropology and history. A named society can have several forms of authority and exchange at the same time. Showing that one obligation was redirected to a ruler would require particular evidence about who previously owed it to whom and how the transfer occurred. The authors give a sharp way of asking such questions. Their categories alone cannot supply the evidence for an account of a particular place. Likewise, an inherited tie can matter deeply to a wage worker even where labor can legally be traded without reference to it. The concept identifies a change in the organization of work whose local consequences remain open to investigation.

What the family explains

The dispute with psychoanalysis turns on how to interpret the relations that appear in attachment, fantasy, and distress. Deleuze and Guattari argue that Oedipal analysis can reduce such relations to positions in a parent-child triangle. On that account, a patient’s references to rank, nationality, religion, or labor readily become signs of relations with parents. The authors ask what happens if reference to the social field is taken seriously on its own terms. Family life then has to be investigated as one place where money, work, law, kinship, and authority are experienced. These relations can be integral to the family’s history. An explanation of them may therefore clarify how a certain family became able to exercise the kind of influence it did. Chapter II, §§1–3, pp. 51–83, and chapter IV, §5, pp. 349–366.

Consider a family that expects a child to take over a failing shop. A family history can help explain why a particular parent turns the expectation into an obligation. It can also matter that credit is offered against a house, that work in the shop structures the family’s day, and that a child who wants a different job has to leave town. Those conditions are encountered through people the child knows well, and they may sustain a particular attachment to the shop. If the child is terrified of leaving, a useful account might address all of them. Starting from their operation lets the family remain important without treating the rest of the town as a set of symbols of family life.

The point is related to the book’s treatment of political attachments. Deleuze and Guattari revisit Wilhelm Reich’s question about why people can desire political arrangements that work against their interests. They distinguish investment of class or interest from unconscious libidinal investment in a group or social formation. In their account, a political commitment involves more than a person’s judgment about who benefits. The meetings, habits, and relations of authority through which a movement is organized also deserve examination. A participant could oppose an unfair arrangement in public and remain deeply attached to the authority exercised by leaders inside the movement. This possibility is one reason a critique of false beliefs is only part of the political problem the authors set themselves. Chapter IV, §§1 and 5, pp. 273–279 and 340–349.

What schizoanalysis would ask

The last chapter lays out negative and positive tasks of schizoanalysis. Its negative task is to loosen constraining interpretations, including the assumption that the family triangle provides the original pattern to which all significant relations return. Its first positive task is to investigate what connects and functions in someone’s desiring-production. Its second is to examine the social field in which desire is invested. In the failing-shop example that would mean examining the actual relations of labor, money, and responsibility alongside the person’s wishes and fears. It would also mean asking who can change the arrangement and which attachments are sustained in it. The book describes an analytic proposal. It does not offer an independent demonstration that the proposed practice produces particular clinical outcomes. Chapter IV, §§3–5, pp. 296–350.

The distinction between schizophrenia as a process and schizophrenia as a clinical condition matters for understanding that proposal. The authors use the first expression for a process at the limit of social decoding and deterritorialization. They explicitly distinguish a process from making clinical schizophrenia into its aim. Their rhetoric can still move rapidly between a conceptual limit, accounts of real distress, and literary material such as Lenz. That movement raises an interpretive difficulty. A reader should be able to ask whether a passage is making a claim about a specific person or about a mode of social organization, and whether the evidence offered actually bears on that claim. The passages on clinical confinement show why that question matters within the book’s own argument. Chapter II, §9, pp. 130–139, and chapter III, §10, pp. 245–255.

One way of testing the value of the approach is to look for explanations that actually differ. Suppose the attachment to the family shop persists after the parent has left and a different employer runs it. That would give us a reason to investigate relations the family alone cannot sustain. Now suppose it changes suddenly when the old owner returns, even though the shop’s conditions of work stay exactly the same. In that case, an explanation that skipped the history of that relationship would have left out something important. A productive account has to specify which connections change the course of an attachment. The mere availability of a wider vocabulary does little work on its own. The strength of the proposal is the invitation to follow relations past their obvious points of interpretation. Its requirement, in any particular case, is to then show what those relations explain.

The choice Deleuze and Guattari offer is ultimately a choice about order of inquiry. When a relation is explained by someone’s private history, ask what other people, processes, and material conditions already enter into that history. When a change dissolves an inherited obligation, ask what now makes an encounter possible and on what terms. When a political group professes a shared interest, ask how its members are attached to the arrangements by which it governs itself. The book keeps bringing these questions back to the same demand for specificity. To understand what people desire, describe what their attachments do and the world in which they can do it.

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@misc{brenndoerfer2025deleuzeguattari, author = {Michael Brenndoerfer}, title = {Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia}, year = {2025}, url = {https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/deleuze-guattari-anti-oedipus-capitalism-schizophrenia-guide}, organization = {mbrenndoerfer.com}, note = {Accessed: 2026-11-19} }
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Michael Brenndoerfer. "Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia." Accessed November 19, 2026. https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/deleuze-guattari-anti-oedipus-capitalism-schizophrenia-guide.
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