Nussbaum's Capability Approach: Human Development and Justice

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated September 29, 202513 min read

Martha Nussbaum's development of the capability approach across multiple works, identifying central human capabilities that just societies must secure for all citizens.

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Part 10 of 12Justice and Political Authority
Chapter 126The conditions of a human life › What Can a Person Actually Do?
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The conditions of a human life › What Can a Person Actually Do?Full chapter · Sections in this chapter1 / 9 ↓

What Can a Person Actually Do?

Suppose two adults have a legal right to apply for the same work. One has learned the skills it requires, can reach the workplace, and can apply without fear of retaliation. The other has the relevant skills too, but cannot travel to the workplace safely. The rule gives them the same formal permission. The choice it gives each of them is different. A theory of justice that starts by asking what people can actually do has a reason to investigate the route to work, as well as the law governing who may apply.

Martha Nussbaum uses this kind of distinction in the Introduction to Women and Human Development. Her accounts of Vasanti and Jayamma in section IV test an idea of development against what particular women can do in their circumstances. Conditions in which a person can earn, take part in a community, or decide about an intimate relationship depend on several institutions. The opportunities should be evaluated for the person herself. An increase in the income of her household tells us little about those choices unless we also know how she can use its resources and who can decide what happens to her.

Nussbaum develops the approach into an account of basic social justice. In Creating Capabilities, chapter 2, she argues that public institutions should secure an ample threshold of central opportunities for each person. She proposes a list rather than requiring a single measure of advantage. The list is meant to identify claims people have on a decent society and to give content to what respecting their dignity requires.

Functionings and the Freedom to Choose

A functioning is an activity or condition a person achieves. Being nourished, reading a book, and taking part in an election are functionings. A capability is a substantive opportunity to achieve something. For example, think about someone who can vote but abstains and someone who cannot get into the polling station. The same entry in a record of turnout can conceal the difference between them. One has a choice about political participation that the other lacks.

This difference affects the kind of public policy Nussbaum calls for. A public authority can aim to put everyone in a position to take part in political decisions while allowing people to decide how to use the opportunity. It can protect the liberty to worship without requiring citizens to practice a religion. Securing a capability is therefore an aim compatible with people valuing different ways of life. The effective opportunities matter even when someone chooses one that the policymaker would never choose for themselves.

There are qualifications. The development of some adult capabilities depends on earlier activities, and making a choice real sometimes requires help before a person can exercise it independently. Schooling is a familiar example. A child who has never had any opportunity to develop literacy has a narrower set of choices later, even if no adult formally forbids them to read. Providing an education expands those future choices. The question is how institutions can support development in a way compatible with the person eventually making choices of their own.

Basic, Internal, and Combined Capabilities

Nussbaum distinguishes three uses of the term in chapter 2 of Creating Capabilities. Basic capabilities are the innate faculties on which further development can build. This is a descriptive starting point. It does not give people greater claims to public support because they begin with more talent. Her threshold can give stronger reason for assistance to people who need more of it to gain the relevant opportunity.

Internal capabilities are developed abilities, traits, and states of the person. They can change over time, and social conditions play an important part in developing them. Someone can learn to speak in public through practice. Once they have learned the skill, denying them the right to address a meeting does not make the acquired skill disappear. It takes away an opportunity to exercise it.

Combined capabilities bring those abilities together with the circumstances in which they could be exercised. Nussbaum explains this distinction on pp. 20–24 of the chapter. A person can have a developed ability to speak and face censorship. Another person can enjoy protections for speech while having had little chance to develop some of the skills needed to make use of them. A society can fail people at either point. The relevant public opportunity requires both the capacities and circumstances necessary for using them.

Think again of the two job applicants. Training could help if one lacked a skill. In the case we started with it would leave the obstacle in place, because both applicants have the skill. A safe route could make the developed capacity usable. That does not tell us that both must apply, or that they must take the job if offered. It tells us why securing the external conditions makes a difference to the real choice.

Ten Areas of Central Capability

The list below follows the headings and substance of Creating Capabilities, pp. 33–34. Each names an area in which Nussbaum argues that people should have substantive opportunities.

  1. Life. People should be able to live a life of ordinary length without premature death or a deterioration so extreme that it makes continued life no longer worth living for them.
  2. Bodily health. This includes an opportunity for good health, including reproductive health, with adequate food and shelter.
  3. Bodily integrity. People should have freedom of movement and security against assault, along with opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for reproductive choice.
  4. Senses, imagination, and thought. People should have opportunities to develop and use these powers with the support of education, including the freedom to create, think, and express themselves.
  5. Emotions. People should be able to form and sustain attachments and respond to loss, without fear and anxiety undermining their emotional development.
  6. Practical reason. People should be able to form an account of what matters to them and reflect on the course of their life.
  7. Affiliation. People should be able to engage with others, and the social conditions of self-respect should protect them against humiliation and discrimination.
  8. Other species. People should be able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the natural world.
  9. Play. People should have room for recreation, laughter, and play.
  10. Control over one's environment. People should have effective opportunities to participate in political choices and to exercise material rights, including fair access to work and property.

Nussbaum gives a special organizing role to practical reason and affiliation on pp. 39–40. The question is how each other opportunity can be made available in a way that treats the person as someone who makes choices and lives among others. Making medical care accessible can include giving a person a say about a proposed treatment. It can also require respecting relationships and privacy during that care. Practical reason and affiliation help specify what dignified access means in that example. Their role does not make the remaining areas optional.

A Threshold for Each Person

A threshold account changes how we assess tradeoffs. Suppose a city improves recreation services while some residents remain unable to travel safely. The new playgrounds are a gain. That gain does not give the residents the security or mobility they lack. In Nussbaum's account the two capabilities have different content, so a surplus of one cannot count by itself as meeting the claim to the other. The same applies across people. A large gain for people who already have secure options does not establish that somebody else has reached an adequate minimum.

The central list therefore does not operate like a single index. It gives reasons to ask about each area and whose circumstances are at issue. One practical difficulty is specifying what counts as enough. A right to participate in public choices may need different means of protection in different places. A constitutional principle can identify what has to be secured without specifying a uniform timetable, technology, or procedure for doing so. At the same time, local discretion cannot make a right effective if residents have no practical way to use it.

Nussbaum treats her proposal as a view of basic entitlements, leaving further questions about inequalities above the threshold open. That limit matters in reading her. Two arrangements can meet the minimum and still invite disagreement about which is more equal or otherwise preferable. Her case for protecting thresholds cannot by itself rank every such pair. It does provide grounds for objecting to systems that protect some opportunities lavishly while leaving others below the level she considers necessary for dignity.

The protection of several distinct capabilities also means conflict is possible. An authority might face a choice in which using scarce resources one way leaves a serious need unmet elsewhere. In chapter 2, pp. 36–38, Nussbaum treats some of these as tragic choices. One option can be better than another even when each leaves a claim unmet. Her point is that choosing the better option does not make the remaining deprivation acceptable. It gives a reason to look for changes in the situation that could avoid forcing people into the same conflict.

Where Sen and Nussbaum Part Company

Nussbaum discusses Amartya Sen's work directly in Women and Human Development, Introduction §III. Both take an interest in the opportunities people have rather than trying to assess a life by resources or reported satisfaction alone. Sen's use of the framework helps compare the quality and justice of people's lives and can leave open which capabilities are most relevant for a particular evaluation. Nussbaum defends a specified list in the service of a more particular project. She wants to say what political entitlements governments should secure for each person.

The difference can be tested with a policy comparison. If we want to ask which transport plan creates more opportunities, we might select the dimensions most relevant to that question and leave other capabilities in the background. If we want to ask whether there are any areas in which public institutions are failing people at the level of basic justice, Nussbaum thinks we need greater assurance that our selection will not omit an important claim. The minimum helps structure the second inquiry. Both inquiries can draw on much of the same evidence.

In “Human Rights and Human Capabilities”, she explains that this account has affinities with the protection of human rights, especially when a right is understood through the institutions and material conditions needed to use it. A right to political participation does little work for someone prevented from getting information or reaching the place where decisions are made. Looking for what makes the right effective adds a question about the public responsibilities its protection entails.

This also helps explain why the proposal grants people room to choose. If someone declines to exercise a capability, that may express their values. If they have learned that they are unlikely to be allowed to exercise it, a report of indifference may tell us something about the world they have faced. Imagine a person who says there is no point in applying for a position never offered to anyone like them. We can take the statement seriously without treating it as sufficient evidence that they have no interest in the opportunity. Whether applying becomes a live option is a separate question from what they eventually choose.

Testing an Opportunity

Take a proposed expansion of adult classes. It may increase the number of places while leaving out people who work the hours when classes meet or need a way to reach them. Asking about a combined capability means tracing the steps a person would have to be able to take. Can they find the material, read it, arrange time, and reach it safely? Is participation allowed on terms that let them be treated as a peer? Those questions do not assume that everyone must attend. They help establish which people have the opportunity the program promises.

The example also shows where to look if gains conflict. An evening class may be suitable for some learners and inaccessible to others. Rather than infer immediately that the institution has to choose one group's access over the other's, we can ask whether it has some freedom in how it offers the class. Even if it must choose under a fixed budget now, recording the unmet claim can guide a later decision about where resources should go. A framework for basic justice helps retain that question after the immediate allocation has been made.

One objection is that a shared list fixes what should matter for people who may hold very different views of the good. Nussbaum's response turns on the distinction between providing an opportunity and requiring its use. Someone can value their own tradition while a public institution protects their ability to exit or disagree with it. How far that response succeeds also depends on how the threshold is set. A list written in general terms still needs arguments about what an effective option means in particular settings, especially arguments informed by the experiences of those whose conditions it is meant to assess.

Seeing Who Has the Option

A household may appear to have enough resources to make several choices possible. To see whether its members actually have those choices, look at how the resources can be used. One member may be able to take money to a medical appointment without asking. Another may need permission to travel or spend money even on necessary care. Both can be described as belonging to the same well-resourced household. That description leaves out who can act on its resources and who is dependent on someone else's consent.

This connects the argument about each person to Nussbaum's treatment of human rights. Political rights, bodily integrity, and opportunities to work concern the people who will make decisions and bear their effects. They cannot be inferred from a household's or country's capacity to achieve a result on average. Asking about each person also resists a reduction of assistance to an investment in somebody else's well-being. Giving an adult an educational opportunity may benefit their children. Its importance includes what the education makes available to that adult.

What counts as a genuine option is sometimes harder to determine than whether a law formally permits an action. The relevant facts may include the person's skills, material conditions, safety, information, and alternatives. As the account of combined capabilities suggests, those factors can constrain an action in different ways. Distinguishing the obstacle is part of deciding whether a change has made the option available. It cannot be settled by assuming that providing one resource always produces the opportunity for everyone who receives it.

Reading Nussbaum

Start with the Introduction to Women and Human Development, §III on Sen and §IV on Vasanti and Jayamma. Creating Capabilities, chapter 2, sets out the kinds of capability, the list, and the threshold in more compact form. Its discussion of tragic choice explains why a failure in one area can remain significant even when institutions are making progress in others.

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@misc{brenndoerfer2025nussbaums, author = {Michael Brenndoerfer}, title = {Nussbaum's Capability Approach: Human Development and Justice}, year = {2025}, url = {https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/nussbaum-capability-approach-human-development-justice-guide}, organization = {mbrenndoerfer.com}, note = {Accessed: 2026-11-19} }
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