Leibniz's Discourse on Metaphysics: Substance and Divine Perfection
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's 1686 systematic treatment of substance, individuation, and the relationship between God's perfection and the created world.
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Individuals and a rational order › The Choice in Caesar's ConceptFull chapter · Sections in this chapter1 / 9 ↓
The Choice in Caesar's Concept
Suppose you knew enough about Caesar to explain why he crossed the Rubicon. Would having that explanation show that he had to cross? Leibniz thinks it would show something narrower. A complete explanation would show why Caesar crossed in the circumstances in which he acted. It would not make stopping as contradictory as a square with three sides. The trouble is that Leibniz asks us to accept something stronger than the possibility of an explanation. In his account, Caesar's complete concept already includes the crossing. How can an act belong to a person's very concept and still count as a choice?
The Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) brings that question together with two others. What distinguishes an individual substance from a collection of properties? And why would a perfect God choose to create this order of things? Treating the questions separately makes it easier to follow Leibniz's answer. The concept of a substance describes the whole course of its life. God's choice concerns which possible course of the world becomes actual. The creature, in turn, acts from its own reasons within that world. Discourse, §§8–9, 13
What Makes Something a Substance?
Calling a thing a substance can begin as a point about grammar. We say that Alexander is a king, but we do not ordinarily predicate Alexander of something else in the way we predicate kingship of him. For Leibniz, this is a clue. It leaves the real question unanswered. What is it about Alexander that makes the statement true? And what would distinguish him from another king who shared some of his qualities? Leibniz asks what a description would have to contain to give an account of this individual rather than just a description that he happens to satisfy. Discourse, §8
A related problem concerns bodies. Size, figure, and motion describe a body, but Leibniz doubts that these properties alone exhaust the nature of a body. He revives the idea of substantial form for this metaphysical problem while rejecting its use as a substitute for studying how things work. Calling something a clock because it has the form of a clock would not tell a repairer how its parts move. The repairer needs the latter explanation even if the philosopher has a further question about what makes a thing one individual rather than an aggregate. Discourse, §§10–12
For Leibniz, the distinguishing feature of an individual substance is that its concept is complete enough to give the grounds of all the predicates truly attributable to it. A finite substance has an intelligible course of its own and still depends on God for its existence and preservation. Self-contained expression and independence of the creator are different claims. Discourse, §§8, 14
The Complete Concept of an Individual
The example in section 8 is Alexander the Great. Kingship alone leaves open which king we mean. It does not tell us whether the king conquered Darius or Porus, or what brought about his death. A historian looks for evidence of these things one at a time. An understanding of Alexander's complete concept, of the kind Leibniz attributes to God, would disclose the grounds of every true predicate about Alexander without waiting for those events to happen. The point is stronger than saying that God knows all the events. Leibniz says there is something in the subject's own concept to understand about why these predicates belong to it. Discourse, §8
Think of the difference between a partial description and a full account. “A king who won a battle” leaves open many individuals. Adding the names of the defeated rulers still does not account for everything this person did or underwent. These are useful descriptions even though they leave much unspecified. The complete concept is an ideal of understanding, so the question of how a historian might assemble such a dossier is beside the point. The historian and God need not obtain knowledge in the same way for their judgments to concern the same events.
Alexander's concept is consequently more than a list of traits. Who he fought and what happened to him are truths about him that also involve other people and events. Leibniz pushes this thought very far. Each substance expresses the entire universe from its own standpoint. He compares this to the different views one can get of a single city. A view from the river and a view from above the walls represent the same city, but they make different features easy to see. There is no requirement that one viewer see everything distinctly. This is an analogy for differing expressions of a common world, rather than a claim that each substance has a physical vantage point. Discourse, §9
Certainty and Necessity
Leibniz considers a difficulty with the complete-concept thesis in section 13. A geometer can derive properties of a circle from its definition. If the crossing can also be derived from Caesar's complete concept, one might conclude that the crossing is necessary in just the same sense. Leibniz thinks the examples differ in the kind of grounds on which the conclusion rests. A geometrical demonstration has grounds that do not depend on God's freely establishing a particular order of things. Caesar's career, however intelligible it is, belongs to such an order. Discourse, §13
In section 13 Leibniz distinguishes absolute necessity, where the contrary is contradictory, from a connection that is necessary only on a supposition. Given the full order of things God chose and the individual concept belonging to it, Caesar's career is assured. Leibniz takes the contrary outcome to be possible considered in itself. The supposition does essential work in the inference. Discourse, §13
An ordinary example helps isolate the distinction. Suppose a description of a meeting includes that everyone arrived before noon. Holding the complete description fixed, one cannot change someone's arrival to one in the afternoon. That says little about whether the person was physically free to take a later train. Leibniz makes a further claim that the actual course of events has reasons that an adequate concept would express. The meeting example shows only how a claim can follow given a description without following from logic alone. It does not provide a theory of how complete concepts are possible.
The source illustrates this with Caesar's dictatorship and makes explicit reference to his decision to cross the Rubicon. A complete proof of why that undertaking succeeded would show, Leibniz says, why crossing was the option Caesar chose and why he won rather than lost at Pharsalus. It would not show that an army stopping at a river makes no sense. Nor can we settle the separate question of whether a differently situated individual is that same Caesar by saying that God could choose a different world. A complete concept, as Leibniz understands it, is individuating, and we cannot change an event in it while holding the whole concept fixed. Discourse, §§8, 13
What Would Make a World Best?
Leibniz opens the Discourse by arguing that divine perfection has implications for how God acts. If goodness applied to the created world simply because God had made it, there would be nothing to explain by saying God chose well. What God did would qualify as good regardless of what it was. Leibniz instead supposes that there are standards of goodness and perfection and that divine wisdom answers to them. He claims that a perfectly wise God acts for the best. This is a claim about the reason for the choice, rather than an argument that less perfect possibilities are self-contradictory. Discourse, §§1–3, 13
What would count as good order? In section 6 Leibniz asks us to imagine drawing some scattered points on a page. He suggests that however haphazard the result looks, it can be brought under a geometrical rule if we allow a sufficiently complicated rule. If we compare two arrangements, merely having a rule will not distinguish the better one. We need to ask what it takes to specify the rule and what the rule produces. Leibniz's proposal about creation combines simplicity of governing principles with richness of phenomena. He offers the drawing as an imperfect comparison to divine wisdom, not as a way of assigning numerical scores to worlds. Discourse, §§5–6
A way to test what the comparison shows is to imagine two drawings that happen to track the same points. One takes a construction that fits them by a short rule. The other uses a longer construction with cases that handle the points one at a time. If all we want to account for is the points we drew, the first is economical. Leibniz also cares about the rich order a system can generate. A shorter recipe for a much poorer result would not, by simplicity alone, settle the comparison. The Discourse gives a reason to value both features without providing a procedure for comparing every possible creation.
Objections About Freedom and Evil
An objection to the complete-concept thesis can survive the distinction between certainty and absolute necessity. Imagine granting that a different course of events contains no contradiction. A critic can still ask whether that possibility belongs to the very agent in the actual circumstances. The critic might accept that Caesar reasons, plans, and acts for what he takes to be good, while still asking whether this is enough for responsibility. Leibniz sees reasons as inclining an agent without making the opposite action contradictory. In the case of a rational creature, he also describes reflecting before acting and suspending judgment where appropriate. These are the faculties through which the decision takes place. The further philosophical issue is whether exercising these faculties is sufficient for freedom once the entire actual sequence is assured. Discourse, §§13, 30
A second difficulty is how evil enters an order chosen by a perfect creator. In section 7 Leibniz distinguishes what God desires or commands from the evil he permits, and in section 30 he takes up the example of Judas. Leibniz treats the betrayal as Judas's own act and asks why God admits to existence this possible person and the sequence of events containing the act. He appeals to the goodness of that sequence as a whole, while acknowledging that we cannot give a detailed account of why it is better. This moves the discussion from what made Judas act to what justified the choice to create this order of things. It does not settle whether such a distinction would be enough to answer a critic of divine responsibility. Discourse, §§7, 30
Suppose someone argues that a good result could come from a bad decision. This is consistent with thinking the decision itself wrong. It is also a much weaker claim than Leibniz needs. To justify the creation as a whole, he has to claim that the good of the selected order warrants permitting its evils in comparison with the alternatives. The fact that a later good follows an evil event does not on its own establish that no better alternative exists. A reader can accept this form of Leibniz's distinction and still find the largest step in his defense unconvincing.
Correspondence Without Direct Influence
The complete concept also helps explain how substances can keep their own histories while belonging to the same world. In section 14 Leibniz says that substances depend continually on God and that their appearances correspond without any direct action one on another. He gives an example of people who plan to meet. Each can travel separately by following the agreed arrangement. If they all do so, their different routes bring them to the agreed place. The analogy illustrates agreement among separate courses of events. Unlike the travelers, the substances in his account do not negotiate the arrangement in advance. Discourse, §14
This has special force for the relation between mind and body. If you step onto a beach, you may hear the sea without noticing the sound of any one wave. Leibniz uses the sound of the sea to illustrate how a recognizable sensation can include a great many contributions that the hearer cannot distinguish. The soul expresses what happens to its own body more distinctly than it expresses much of the rest of the world. Yet the soul's perceptions arise from its own nature and correspond to what occurs in its associated body. The correspondence is his explanation of their union. An extraordinary intervention on each occasion of seeing or hearing would put off the question of why these events ordinarily agree. Discourse, §§32–33
The account sounds as if it has no room for talk of one thing acting upon another. Section 15 explains why we can still speak that way. In a change that involves two substances, Leibniz identifies activity with an increase in the first substance’s degree of expression and passivity with a corresponding decrease for the second. His explanation of ordinary language therefore depends on which substance better expresses or accounts for the change. What it does not involve is a feature moving across from one substance to make another one act. Calling all causal talk strictly false would miss that distinction. It would also miss the value Leibniz places on mechanical explanations in physics. Discourse, §§10, 14–15, 32
Reading the Arguments Together
The difference between expression and knowledge matters here. Saying that Alexander expresses the whole universe does not imply that he can answer every question about it. The complete concept belongs to the account of who Alexander is. What he can distinguish in experience depends on his perspective and his powers of attention. Imagine seeing a crowd from the end of a street. Your impression can depend on all the people in it without your being able to identify every face. This is a limited analogy for how much can be expressed confusedly. It does not explain how a finite individual's concept could include the entire course of the world. That further commitment comes from Leibniz's metaphysics. Discourse, §§9, 33
These arguments set different tasks for explanations. When we ask why Caesar acted, we look at the reasons of the agent and his situation. When we ask why that entire history obtains, Leibniz points to God's choice of one order of things. When we ask why one person's perceptions agree with those of another, the relevant feature is how their distinct histories express that same order. These answers put different weights on the complete concept. It explains why an event belongs to a particular individual, while the choice of a world explains why that individual and these events are actual.
A useful reading exercise is to return to section 13 with the story of Caesar in mind. For each premise, ask whether it is a claim about logical possibility, a description of this actual choice, or a claim about the reasons of an agent. Try doing the same with the argument about Judas in section 30. If a premise about what happens in this world looks necessary, ask what supposition has been held fixed to make it so. Reading the passages in this way helps separate the explanatory power of Leibniz's distinctions from the very strong metaphysical picture he asks us to accept. Discourse, §§13, 30
Further Reading
- G. W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, translated by George R. Montgomery. Start with sections 8, 13, and 14 for the sequence from substance to contingency to correspondence.
- G. W. Leibniz, Monadology, translated by Robert Latta. Sections 53–62 return to the choice of a world and the different perspectives from which substances express it.
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