Husserl's Logical Investigations: Logic and Intentionality
Edmund Husserl's 1900–1901 study of pure logic, meaning, and the intentional acts through which we understand and know.
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Intentionality and the objects of thought › What Makes an Inference Valid?Full chapter · Sections in this chapter1 / 8 ↓
What Makes an Inference Valid?
Suppose two people are checking the same proof. One recognizes at once that a step follows. The other pauses and reads the premises again. If that step is valid, the time it takes each person to see why is a separate question. Edmund Husserl starts Logical Investigations with a disagreement about that difference. Some of his contemporaries looked to psychology to ground logic. He asks what would happen to the idea of a proof if its validity depended on how an actual person passes from one thought to the next. Prolegomena, §§17–23
Husserl came to this problem through work on arithmetic and the formal systems in which mathematical proofs are carried out. In the preface he recalls how difficult it was to give a logical account of what mathematicians do when their formal operations carry them beyond the cases for which they first learned a rule. The question was what justifies the resulting proofs and how the various kinds of knowledge fit together. His difficulty in answering led to a broader question about the scope of logic. Prolegomena, preface
The book appeared in two volumes, the Prolegomena to Pure Logic in 1900 and the six investigations in 1901. The first volume criticizes the psychologistic theory of logic and sets out tasks for a pure logic. The second turns to acts of speaking, understanding, and knowing. The two questions belong together for Husserl. The truth of a claim can hold independently of a person passing judgment, and we still need an account of how someone comes to understand the claim and see that it is true. Prolegomena, §§62–72 · Investigations, introduction
The Problem of Psychologism
Husserl discusses several versions of psychologism. A common idea is that the rules by which we ought to judge or infer have their theoretical basis in a science of mental processes. This is more than the uncontroversial claim that actually carrying out a proof requires a person capable of following it. The issue is whether the nature and validity of the rules can ultimately be explained by facts about mental life. Prolegomena, §§17–20
Consider the rule usually called modus ponens. If the lock has turned, the bolt has moved. The lock has turned. The conclusion is that the bolt has moved. The rule concerns what follows from those premises, whether or not they happen to be true of this lock. One could replace each proposition with a quite different one and keep the same inferential form. A survey could tell you how often readers draw the conclusion or where they usually go wrong. The validity of the step applies even in a case in which all the readers miss it. Husserl uses this form of inference to ask where, in what the rule says, the existence of any act of judgment is asserted. Prolegomena, §§21–23
In the debate of the Prolegomena, psychologism grounds logic in psychology. Husserl distinguishes the causal question of how people arrive at judgments from the logical question of whether what they infer follows. Prolegomena, §§17–24
There is also a distinction between instruction in reasoning and pure logic. A teacher might tell a student to write the premises on separate lines. A class might genuinely make fewer errors if its students use that method, and observations about attention and memory might explain the improvement. A logical law has a different bearing on the exercise. It establishes what has to be true of a step for it to count as a valid inference. It can guide reasoning because it establishes a relation that holds among the propositions in the first place. This is why Husserl asks which theoretical truths underlie the practical uses of logic. Prolegomena, §§14–20, 21–23
The Arguments Against Psychologism
One argument concerns what warrants each kind of law. A psychological generalization is supported by observations and rests on induction. Even a law stated in exact terms in an empirical science draws its warrant as a claim about the world from evidence available up to that point. A pure logical law, for Husserl, is exact and warrants a different kind of insight. An observed counterexample to the claim that students invariably reason in a particular way could alter that claim. An observed mistake would leave open the question of what follows from their premises, and the fact that it counts as a mistake requires such a question. Prolegomena, §§21–23
A second distinction is between the judgment as an event and what is judged. In his discussion of relativism, Husserl takes the claim that two times two equals four. One person's act of judging it occurs at a certain time and may have been prompted by something a teacher said. A second person can judge the same thing for a different reason. The two events have different histories. Each can nevertheless be a judgment of the same content. The claim can be correct without inheriting a time of origin from either act. Prolegomena, §§23–24, 36
Husserl presses the issue against the idea that truth itself depends on the constitution of a species. Differences in how two species arrive at judgments would be entirely intelligible. Even their useful methods of calculation could differ. The trouble arises when they are supposed to affirm and deny one and the same claim and both be correct on account of what species they happen to belong to. That is stronger than saying they see different things or use words differently. Husserl argues that calling both judgments true in the same sense changes the meaning of truth while still relying on that meaning to advance the thesis. One of his tests is to suppose that there were no truths. The very claim that there are no truths would then have to be true. The argument concerns what is being claimed, quite apart from whether a particular relativist can be persuaded to change their mind. Prolegomena, §§35–36, 46
The Turn to Meaning
If the same proposition can be judged on different occasions, how do we recognize what stays the same? Husserl begins the first investigation by considering how words work as signs. Smoke can indicate a fire because taking in the smoke gives you a reason to suspect that something is burning. Someone can also use the words the fire is out to express a claim. In conversation the words do two things at once. They convey a meaning about the fire, and they can indicate to the listener that the speaker has had some relevant experience or formed a judgment. A person silently rehearsing the sentence can still express the same thought to themselves, without using the words as evidence of a speaker's state of mind. Investigation I, §§1–4, 7–9
Husserl uses a geometry example. When a teacher says the three altitude lines of a nondegenerate Euclidean triangle meet at a point, a listener may learn that the teacher judges this to be so. That point can lie outside the triangle. The geometrical assertion is about the triangle. It can be repeated by another teacher and remain the same assertion even if the voice, the language, or the surrounding circumstances change. Its meaning also differs from what it is about. A geometer might reach the same point by reasoning about angles and by reasoning about intersections. Distinguishing the point, the ways it is specified, and the occasions on which it is thought gives the analysis more to work with than a general reference to the idea in someone's head. Investigation I, §§11–12
Meaning accordingly allows for a range of cases. The word triangle can be understood without a picture of a particular triangle accompanying the thought. A picture, if one occurs, has a determinate size and shape. What is meant by the word may apply just as well to a figure with different sides. The same difference appears when the words can be understood even though we may be unable to find an object that answers to them. Husserl considers the golden mountain as an example of a meaningful expression for which no existing object need be found. Investigation I, §§12–15, and II, §§1–5
What Makes an Experience Intentional?
The Fifth Investigation turns to different ways of being directed toward something. Imagine hearing that a train has left. You can accept it, doubt it, or hope that it is true. While the topic is the same, each is a different kind of act. Husserl calls this feature the quality of the act. The matter specifies what is meant and how it is meant. Judging that the train has left and judging that it is still at the platform share a quality but differ in matter. These are distinctions within the experiences. The two judgments concern the same train, while what each claims about the train differs. Investigation V, §§16–21
The language of being directed toward an object can mislead. If you imagine a unicorn, it makes sense to ask what you are imagining whether or not there are any unicorns. Introducing a second unicorn that exists as an object inside the act would confuse what you are imagining with what belongs to your experience of imagining it. Husserl also distinguishes acts from features of experience that are not themselves object-directed. A sensory feature can enter into hearing a train without being the object you are attending to when you hear the train. Investigation V, §§9–11, 14–17
Intentionality is the directedness of an act such as perceiving, doubting, or remembering. An analysis can ask what the act is directed toward, how it presents that object, and which kind of act it is. A remembered tune and a tune you currently hear give you different ways of attending to what may be the same tune. Investigation V, §§9–11, 16–21
The middle investigations make related distinctions on the side of what is meant. The Second asks how a universal can be intended when the example before you is individual. The Third studies relations of whole and part, including the difference between parts that can exist independently and dependent features. The Fourth asks what lets meanings combine. Consider the difference between a door that is at once open and closed in the same respect, and a string like door and if the. There is enough of a claim in the first to see the incompatibility. In the second, the words supply no such complete claim. Both can be called nonsense in ordinary speech. The distinction gives Husserl a reason to study the ways meanings can combine before judging whether a combination can be true. Investigation II, §§1–5, III, §§1–5, and IV, §§10–14
What It Is to See for Yourself
Husserl uses the term fulfillment when what an expression had merely meant is given in a corresponding intuition. Someone tells you about a red patch on a poster in another room. Before walking through the door, you can understand what they meant. After you see the poster, you can take the red patch that you now see as the very one referred to. The two acts have come into a relation of identification. Merely seeing something else red on the way would fail to bring about this relation, and the patch you turn out to see could be the right patch but the wrong color. In the latter case the initial intention meets something that conflicts with it. Investigation VI, §§6–11
The difference between fulfilling an intention and having a feeling of certainty matters. The report may have sounded so convincing that you felt certain even before leaving the room. Seeing the patch supplies something of a different kind. Husserl also distinguishes degrees of fulfillment. You can make out the color from the doorway while its precise shape remains hard to see. If the claim involves the border of the patch as well as its color, a closer look could give it a kind of support that your first glimpse could not. Investigation VI, §§16–20, 36–39
The sixth investigation also contains Husserl's account of categorial intuition. He asks how we can see that a sheet of paper is white. There is the perceived paper and its color, but no additional visible patch corresponding to the word is. Still, a person looking at the sheet can come to see that the claim is true. Husserl describes a further act, founded on the simpler perceptions, through which the state of affairs is given. That act depends on what the senses supply, while making explicit something that cannot be matched to an extra sensation alongside the rest. Investigation VI, §§40–46
Husserl's example also explains why attending to one's own act of judgment would lead to a different result. A person could shift attention from the paper to the experience of judging and notice a moment of hesitation. That might tell them something about how they reached the judgment that the paper is white. The moment of hesitation belongs to their experience. The paper's being white is what they take themselves to have seen, and they could recognize the same fact on a later occasion without hesitating at all. Husserl makes this distinction when he asks where concepts such as being and state of affairs get their content. Investigation VI, §44
How the Two Volumes Fit Together
In the opening volume, the validity of an inference survives a person's failure to recognize it. In the final investigations, Husserl asks what it takes for a person to recognize that something is as they have judged it to be. To see the connection, imagine a student who can repeat the statement about a triangle's altitudes and point out an instance drawn on the page. That already displays different ways of relating to the statement. To see why the claim holds generally, the student must understand what in the proof warrants the conclusion. A good drawing can direct attention to relevant features. The claim concerns all triangles of the stipulated kind, including ones that look quite different from this drawing. Prolegomena, §§6–8, 21–23 · Investigation I, §§9–12
One question remains pressing. If all our encounters with meanings are singular events, what entitles us to say that we grasped the same meaning twice? The book responds by distinguishing what changes from what remains identifiable across occasions. I may first hear someone's words and later put the same claim in writing. Each act has a place in my history. I can still compare the inscribed sentence with what I took the speaker to have said and ask whether I got it right. That everyday possibility motivates Husserl's account, even for a reader who wishes to question how he describes ideal meanings. Investigation I, §§11–12, 30–32
This explains why the discussion of consciousness belongs in a book that starts with logic. Husserl's descriptions examine how a claim can be understood, how someone can encounter what it concerns, and how the encounter can justify believing it. Questions about which mental events brought someone to a judgment are still open to psychological study. The investigation of validity and the investigation of how validity is grasped give a reader separate questions to ask the next time an argument seems convincing. Investigations, introduction · Investigation VI, §§6–11
Further Reading
- Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, 1900. §§17–24 distinguish pure logical laws from empirical laws of thinking.
- Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Investigations I–V, revised German edition, 1913. Start with I §§7–12 and V §§16–21 for the analyses of meaning and experience.
- Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Investigation VI, revised German edition, 1921. §§6–11 track fulfillment and disappointment, and §§40–46 introduce categorial intuition.
- Edmund Husserl, selections from Logical Investigations, translated by J. N. Findlay. This Oxford University Press preview includes the triangle example and the discussion of how a meaning can remain the same across distinct acts.
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