Leibniz's Monadology: Simple Substances and Pre-Established Harmony
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's 1714 concise statement of his metaphysics of monads—simple, windowless substances whose harmony is pre-established by God.
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Simple substances and a complex world › The Push and the DecisionFull chapter · Sections in this chapter1 / 10 ↓
The Push and the Decision
Picture someone reaching for a cup and knocking it over. The movement of the arm, the cup's contact with the table, and the sound of the impact belong to one physical sequence. The decision to reach, the surprise, and the recognition that the cup fell belong to the person's experience. Why should these two sequences correspond? Leibniz has an answer that starts far from the spilled cup. He asks what would make anything more basic than a collection of parts, and then what kinds of change such a thing could undergo. Monadology, §§1–7, 78–81
The Monadology, written in 1714, develops the answer in ninety short sections. Its claim that simple substances are windowless is easy to remember and easy to overstate. It concerns what a created substance can receive into its inner being from another created substance. Leibniz still discusses bodily motion and contact, the intentions of rational creatures, and ways we can say that one thing acts on another. The distinction between these forms of explanation is the point of the argument. Monadology, §§7, 49–52, 61, 78–81
Why Begin With Simple Substances?
Leibniz begins with the existence of compounds. A compound is a collection. Calling its members compounds too might help us describe a second level of organization, but Leibniz thinks this cannot tell us what ultimately has the unity that allows the parts to constitute a collection. His proposal is that there are simple substances, which he calls monads. Since a simple substance has no parts, he takes it to have no spatial extension, figure, or divisibility. Monadology, §§1–3
Readers sometimes hear this as a claim that a physical object can be cut down only so far, until we reach something that cannot be divided. That would make monads tiny particles of matter. Leibniz denies that a monad has any size in the first place. Later he says that matter is actually subdivided without end. The difference matters. An account of why a collection depends on its members need not assign those members the same spatial properties the collection has. Monadology, §§3, 64–65
The first step also exposes an objection. Someone who thinks that bodies can be entirely made up of ever smaller bodies may deny that composition requires anything simple. The first sections do not settle the question merely by using the word compound. Leibniz treats aggregates as depending on unities whose unity does not itself arise from aggregation. Once we know that this premise is in play, the first step is easier to assess. Monadology, §§1–3
A second consequence concerns what makes or destroys a thing. A machine can be assembled when parts are brought together and can come apart when they are separated. In the case of a simple substance, there are no parts to bring together or separate. Leibniz says a monad could begin only by creation and end only by annihilation. The claim gives it a kind of persistence through ordinary changes. It does not make it independent of God. Monadology, §§4–7, 39–47
Windows, Perception, and Change
A compound can change when one part is moved by another. That explanation is unavailable for a simple substance. In section 7 Leibniz argues that there is nothing in a monad to rearrange and that we cannot account for a change by imagining a quality leaving one substance and entering another. He describes monads as having no windows, which gives a memorable form to the idea that a created monad cannot intervene directly in another's inner state. Monadology, §7
A monad is a substance without parts. It can have qualities and undergo changes despite lacking spatial extension. Leibniz explains its inner life through perceptions and the transitions between them. Monadology, §§1–3, 8–15
A windowless monad may sound inert. Leibniz instead assumes that created monads change continuously and concludes that their natural changes must have an internal principle. He uses perception for a state that represents a multiplicity within a single substance. Appetition is the activity by which the internal principle moves it from one perception toward another. Appetition does not require the monad to reach exactly the state toward which it tends. It can arrive at new perceptions along the way. Monadology, §§10–16
How a Simple Being Can Represent Many Things
A perception can have a complicated content without itself being an arrangement of physical pieces. Leibniz asks readers to consider the variety in the object of even an ordinary conscious thought. For example, thinking about three music notes together includes several elements in what is being thought about. That does not show that Leibniz is right about the simplicity of a soul. It clarifies what someone who accepts that simplicity needs to account for. A unity can have a state with varied content. Monadology, §§13–16
Leibniz treats perception as broader than conscious awareness. A monad can represent something without clearly distinguishing what it represents. A reader who equates perception with attention would lose the contrast that he uses to describe the range of monads. Monadology, §§14, 19–24, 60
The activity of the internal principle that brings about a passage from one perception to another. The term extends beyond deliberate desire. It belongs to Leibniz's account of change even where there is no conscious consideration of a goal. Monadology, §§14–15
Leibniz's principle says that a true statement or fact has a sufficient reason why it is so rather than otherwise, although we are often unable to know that reason. A reason for a contingent fact does not make the fact necessary. The opposite of a contingent truth is possible. Monadology, §§31–38
Soul and body proceed according to their own laws and agree with each other. The harmony is between substances that represent one and the same universe. Agreement does not require one created monad to produce an internal alteration in another. Monadology, §§51, 56–57, 78–81
Leibniz distinguishes monads by how they represent the world. Lacking size and figure, they cannot differ by how much room they occupy. He instead denies that any two monads are intrinsically indistinguishable and describes their perceptions as having different degrees of distinctness. These differences give him a way to think about individuality without reaching for the dimensions or textures by which we ordinarily distinguish objects. Monadology, §§8–9, 56–60
The Mill and What It Is Meant to Show
In section 17 Leibniz imagines a machine that could think and perceive. Enlarge it until you could walk around inside it as you might walk through a mill. What would you find? He expects that you would find the parts interacting, one piece pressing or turning another. He argues that there would be nothing among those interactions to explain a perception. He therefore places perception in a simple substance. Monadology, §17
The mill is an invitation to compare what a mechanical description explains with what still seems to be missing. A repairer could tell you why a gear is turning. The harder question, for Leibniz, is what makes a state count as a single perception. Someone who thinks experience can arise from an organization of parts can accept everything the visitor finds and deny the inference Leibniz draws from it. Walking through the mill does not by itself show what capacities the whole mechanism can have.
The example is worth rereading with that objection in view. The claim that you cannot point to a perception as an extra component is weaker than the claim that the machine cannot perceive. Leibniz's argument needs the idea that the unity of a perception cannot be accounted for by the way parts are arranged or act on each other. Once that premise is explicit, a reader can ask whether the rest of the argument gives enough reason to accept it. Monadology, §§13–17
The mill also clarifies what Leibniz's project would have to provide beyond an argument against mechanical perception. A simple substance supplies a possible place for the unity he seeks. It still leaves the further question of how one substance can represent an entire scene. His answer appeals to how it expresses the common world, a relationship that depends on the way all of its states agree with those of other substances. Monadology, §§14, 56–61
Consider Leibniz's description of the same town seen from several sides. The view down a street and the view from a hill can have almost nothing in common in what stands out to the viewer. They can still be views of the same town. For Leibniz each monad expresses one universe, but much of what it represents is confused. The thought is about relations among distinct representations. The comparison concerns how each monad represents the world. The hill and the street belong to the example. Monadology, §§3, 56–62
Why the Histories Agree
The cup example now looks different. If I reach for a drink, I can explain the act by the end I was pursuing and the means I chose. My arm and the cup can also be described through their motions and the physical changes that follow from them. In sections 78 and 79 Leibniz invokes the agreement of these two orders. He places appetitions, ends, and means on the side of souls and motions and efficient causes on the side of bodies. The two ways of describing the incident have different explanatory roles. Monadology, §§78–81
Here is a limited comparison. Imagine listening to two recordings of a conversation which were made from different places in the room. At playback neither recording receives information from the other, yet a dropped cup seems to interrupt the two at corresponding moments. The comparison is useful for thinking about agreement without exchange at the time of playback. The recordings have a common causal source and use material equipment. Leibniz's monads are simple, and the agreement among them has its reason in God's ordering of one universe. The recordings cannot explain how this stronger claim is supposed to work. Monadology, §§51–57
Nor does agreement require the histories to be identical. In one person's experiences, the decision to reach can stand out. Another person may hear the crash and have very little idea what led to it. In the town comparison, each point of view makes a different part of a shared order easier to distinguish. The distinctness of a finite monad's perceptions is limited, though what it expresses is much wider. Monadology, §§56–62
Is Causal Talk Still Useful?
Someone might object that agreement merely gives another name to the problem. Why do the histories line up at all? Leibniz's own answer needs more than the nature of each substance taken by itself. He says that God regulates the whole and in doing so has regard to each substance. The independent unfolding of each finite monad therefore does not explain why any arbitrary collection of such histories would fit together. The history of each belongs to one order of things. Monadology, §§51–56, 59–60
Another objection is that the harmony seems to leave us unable to explain why one event follows from another. Leibniz distinguishes physical influence on the inner being of a created monad from several things we can still explain. He recognizes physical processes between bodies and uses the language of efficient causes for their motions. He also says there is a qualified sense in which one monad acts in relation to another. What is distinctly expressed in one can give a reason for what is less distinctly expressed in the other. He calls the influence ideal in section 51. Monadology, §§49–52, 61, 78–81
This response leaves a disagreement open. We may accept that physical explanations are useful while asking whether the relations Leibniz assigns to bodies and monads are enough to make such explanations true. If we were investigating why a cup broke, the physical interactions of the arm, the cup, and the floor would still matter. The metaphysical question is whether that explanation ultimately requires a substance to change the inner state of another. Leibniz's answer changes which sort of dependence we should take to be fundamental. Monadology, §§51, 61, 79–81
The different kinds of causation also help explain why the two descriptions can be read together without being substituted for each other. Asking why a person reached for the cup is a reasonable way to find out whether they were thirsty or trying to clear the table. Asking what accelerated the cup toward the floor is a different question. The success of one explanation does not make the other question meaningless. Leibniz asks us to understand why the answers belong to a single order. Monadology, §§78–81
Sufficient Reason and the Choice of a World
The sufficient-reason principle is the bridge from the histories of finite beings to Leibniz's account of God's role. For an illustration he takes his own act of writing. It has a long history of bodily movements and dispositions, and there are tendencies in his soul that help explain what he is trying to do. As we study these details, each contingent fact can lead to further contingent facts. Leibniz thinks that even indefinitely many such explanations do not explain why that whole sequence obtains. He locates the ultimate ground in a necessary being, God. Monadology, §§31–39
The move is contentious. A reader might be satisfied if each particular state can be explained by earlier states. Leibniz asks for a different kind of answer. Why do these states and their relations make up the actual sequence of the world? An older item in the sequence would itself belong to what he wants to explain. The argument requires that the sequence as a whole needs a reason and that a reason within the sequence cannot do the job he has in mind. Monadology, §§36–38
There is a second use of sufficient reason when Leibniz says that infinitely many possible universes are present as ideas in God. Only one of them is actual, so there must be a reason to actualize this one in preference to the rest. Leibniz appeals to the degree of perfection of the possible orders. God's wisdom knows which is best, goodness chooses it, and power produces it. He connects order and variety to that perfection by describing the multitude of perspectives on a single universe. Monadology, §§53–59
Readers can distinguish this proposal from the question whether we can compare entire alternative worlds. Leibniz gives a general answer about what God's reasons concern. That does not hand a finite observer a procedure for adding up the imperfections and merits of everything that might have happened. The distinction is especially relevant if we ask how suffering could belong to the best possible order. A person who doubts that premise need not claim that no order of any sort exists. Monadology, §§53–60, 90
It is also worth distinguishing an expression of the world from a report that makes all the facts accessible. A finite monad does not survey all of the alternatives just because it expresses everything that occurs in its own world. In Leibniz's account it grasps distinctly only a relatively small part of what it represents. Judging the world from a particular place is therefore different from the divine comparison on which the argument depends. Monadology, §§53–55, 60–62
Souls, Animals, and Rational Minds
Leibniz uses the word soul in a stricter sense than monad when he discusses more distinct perception accompanied by memory. An animal can use a remembered experience to expect something. A rational mind can also make use of necessary truths and reflect on itself. Leibniz's comparison is between someone who expects daylight because they remember the regular sequence of days and someone who seeks a rational account of why to expect it. He takes memory to explain an expectation without making it a demonstration. Monadology, §§19, 26–30
He gives an organic body a dominant monad. The body itself has parts, and these can enter and leave over time. Leibniz compares this change to the flow of a river. The dominance of a monad therefore does not mean the same collection of particles belongs to it forever. For Leibniz, created spirits are never entirely without bodies. Monadology, §§63–72
This helps bring the earlier distinctions together. A living body can be organized, change its parts, and follow bodily laws. The monad associated with it has a sequence of perceptions that gives its own account of a world to which that body belongs. Memories matter where perceptions of events can guide an animal's expectations. Rational reflection matters where a mind can ask for the grounds of its judgment. Monadology, §§26–30, 62–72, 78–81
The chapters of the Discourse on Metaphysics about the complete concept and the union of soul and body can be read alongside this account. The end of the Monadology develops a further concern of its own. Rational minds can reflect on God and share a moral order that Leibniz calls the City of God. The harmony there concerns the relation between nature and grace, alongside the familiar agreement of efficient and final causes. The text ends by asking how a single nature could encompass both physical processes and a moral order, a stronger claim than the claim that the histories of two substances correspond. Monadology, §§83–90
Further Reading
- Leibniz, Monadology, translated by Robert Latta. Read §§1–17 for the conception of a monad, §§31–38 for sufficient reason, and §§78–81 for the explanation of soul and body.
- Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, translated by George R. Montgomery. Compare §§8–15 and 33 with the account of representation and correspondence.
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