Simple substances and a complex world › Why Begin With Simple Substances?

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated November 24, 20252 min read
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Part 6 of 12Being, Change, and Possibility
Chapter 73Simple substances and a complex world › Why Begin With Simple Substances?
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Leibniz begins with the existence of compounds. A compound is a collection. Calling its members compounds too might help us describe a second level of organization, but Leibniz thinks this cannot tell us what ultimately has the unity that allows the parts to constitute a collection. His proposal is that there are simple substances, which he calls monads. Since a simple substance has no parts, he takes it to have no spatial extension, figure, or divisibility. Monadology, §§1–3

Readers sometimes hear this as a claim that a physical object can be cut down only so far, until we reach something that cannot be divided. That would make monads tiny particles of matter. Leibniz denies that a monad has any size in the first place. Later he says that matter is actually subdivided without end. The difference matters. An account of why a collection depends on its members need not assign those members the same spatial properties the collection has. Monadology, §§3, 64–65

The first step also exposes an objection. Someone who thinks that bodies can be entirely made up of ever smaller bodies may deny that composition requires anything simple. The first sections do not settle the question merely by using the word compound. Leibniz treats aggregates as depending on unities whose unity does not itself arise from aggregation. Once we know that this premise is in play, the first step is easier to assess. Monadology, §§1–3

A second consequence concerns what makes or destroys a thing. A machine can be assembled when parts are brought together and can come apart when they are separated. In the case of a simple substance, there are no parts to bring together or separate. Leibniz says a monad could begin only by creation and end only by annihilation. The claim gives it a kind of persistence through ordinary changes. It does not make it independent of God. Monadology, §§4–7, 39–47

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