Frege's On Sense and Reference: Why an Identity Can Inform

Michael BrenndoerferUpdated May 19, 202613 min read

Gottlob Frege distinguishes sense from reference to explain why an identity can teach us something and how words work inside reports of belief.

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Part 8 of 12Logic, Language, and Interpretation
Chapter 98Meaning and reference › Why an Identity Can Teach You Something
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Why an Identity Can Teach You Something

Draw three straight lines that cross at one point. You can specify the point by intersecting the first two lines, or by intersecting the last two. Given a drawing, it may be easy to see that these intersections coincide. What is informative is the recognition that two constructions land on the same point. Merely saying that the intersection of the first two lines is the intersection of those same lines teaches you something different, if anything.

Gottlob Frege introduces a version of the geometric case in his 1892 essay On Sense and Reference. He also compares the expressions morning star and evening star. Both designate Venus in the example. Knowing that one is the other can still involve a discovery. The geometric case matters because Frege's contrast concerns how a true identity presents itself to someone who understands it. It does not require every informative identity to depend on an observation of the sky. Frege, pp. 25–27

The puzzle puts pressure on an account that treats the contribution of a name as exhausted by its bearer. If the same thing stands behind the two expressions, why do the different ways of stating their identity matter? An answer has to explain that difference while still allowing the two expressions to refer to the same thing.

The Core Insight

Frege calls the thing designated by a name its Bedeutung, commonly translated here as reference. He calls the way it is presented its Sinn, or sense. Two names can have the same reference while differing in sense. The two ways of finding the point in the diagram help illustrate the distinction. A difference between the constructions remains even when the diagram has just one point at the relevant intersection. Frege, pp. 26–27

Sinn and Bedeutung

The sense of a name concerns how its bearer is presented. The reference, when there is one, is the bearer itself. A sentence also has a sense, but its sense is the complete thought it expresses. This is a different use of the distinction from applying it to a name within the sentence.

The distinction between a sense and a private idea matters to Frege. Two people may picture the same drawing differently, or only one of them may form a vivid image. They can nonetheless grasp the same way of identifying the point. Frege allows that users of an ordinary name can sometimes understand it in different ways while referring to the same person. He illustrates this in a note with variants in how a person might understand the name Aristotle. That variation is different from the ordinary differences between one person's mental image and another's. Frege, pp. 27 and 29–31

When a Sense Does and Does Not Lead to a Reference

Frege uses proper name broadly for expressions that purport to designate a single object. It can take several words to specify the point where two lines meet. The fact that an expression has several words does not by itself prevent the phrase from working as a name in Frege's broad sense. His account also leaves open the possibility that we understand a phrase that fails to designate something. Frege, pp. 26–28

Grasping one way of specifying an object gives a limited perspective. Suppose you know how to identify the intersection of the first two lines but haven't checked how the third line is drawn. You might grasp the description involving the third line without being able to tell whether its point is the same. The issue is which sense, if another is given, leads to the same bearer. Knowing what the words of a description mean is compatible with needing evidence to decide whether the two names co-refer. It is also compatible with the description failing to name anything. Frege, pp. 27–28

A whole declarative sentence has a thought as its sense. Where the sentence has its ordinary reference, Frege identifies that reference with its truth value. He distinguishes the True from the False, so true sentences can have the same reference while expressing very different thoughts. In this part of the essay the relevant claim concerns declarative sentences, not every command, question, or fragment of reported speech. Frege examines clauses that do other jobs later in the paper. Frege, pp. 32–35 and 36–39

Common Misconception

Frege's sense is not a mental image or a subjective idea. A mental image of the morning star is private to the individual; Frege's sense is objective and shareable. Two people looking at Venus in the morning can have different visual images while grasping the same sense, the same cognitive content, of "the morning star."

Why the Reference of a Sentence Is Its Truth Value

Think of two declarative sentences, one saying that the morning star is illuminated by the sun and the other saying so of the evening star. Frege uses this pair to test a proposal about what a sentence refers to. If we change a component to one with the same reference, the sentence's ordinary reference should stay the same. Yet a person who does not know that both names pick out Venus might accept one claim and reject the other. It is therefore possible for the thought to change while the reference stays fixed. Frege concludes that the thought cannot do both jobs. Frege, pp. 32–33

What does stay the same under this substitution, assuming the expressions function in their ordinary way? In this example the truth value stays the same. If the object is illuminated by the sun, it is illuminated regardless of which name we used to speak about it. The test has a different result from a test of cognitive significance. A listener may need to know something additional to see why a differently worded claim is true. Frege uses this contrast to explain his proposal that the ordinary reference of a declarative sentence is its truth value, while its sense is the thought. The substitution test motivates the proposal. The detailed treatment of clauses in the rest of the essay examines how it can work across more complicated examples. Frege, pp. 32–35 and 36–39

Two True Sentences Can Teach Different Things

Saying that two true sentences have the same reference in Frege's account gives one answer to what they share. Their thoughts can still differ. Knowing only that both are true leaves you without the information each sentence expresses.

The issue becomes pressing when a name fails to refer. Frege considers a sentence about Odysseus arriving in Ithaca while asleep. It expresses a thought that can be followed in a story. Whether Odysseus is a bearer to whom the name refers matters when we ask for the sentence's truth in the ordinary way. Frege connects our interest in the reference of constituent names with our interest in truth. The thought can be available even when failure of an embedded name's reference prevents the sentence from having an ordinary truth value. His point concerns how the parts contribute, whether or not we are concerned with belief in the story. Frege, pp. 32–33

Why Reports of Belief Are Different

Imagine Ada believes that the morning star is illuminated by the sun. Suppose she has no view about whether what she calls the evening star is illuminated. Reporting what Ada believes is a different act from asserting the first sentence on our own account. Even if we can interchange the names in our own ordinary astronomical claim, the corresponding belief reports can diverge. Introducing Ada here lets us make the example without having to settle what any historical astronomer knew.

Frege's account of indirect discourse says that an expression can have an indirect reference. In the relevant uses its indirect reference is its ordinary sense. Within a report about Ada's belief, changing a name to one with the same ordinary reference can therefore change what the name contributes to the report. The two names can have different senses, and those senses are what matter to the report under this proposal. The embedded declarative material contributes a thought for the attitude to be about. Frege, pp. 28 and 36–37

A useful test is to compare an assertion and its quotation. A person can assert a statement about Venus, or say that a friend uttered a particular group of words. Replacing the morning star with the evening star inside a direct quotation would change the words being reported, even if the reference in an ordinary assertion would stay the same. Indirect speech is a different case from exact quotation. Frege takes what matters in many indirect reports to be the thought, rather than the literal words or the mere truth value of the embedded sentence. Distinguishing the cases keeps one test of substitution from being misapplied to another. Frege, pp. 28 and 36–37

Test a Substitution in Two Contexts

Take two expressions that designate the same object. Put them into a simple assertion and ask what happens to its truth value. Then put them into a report of what another person believes and ask whether the person grasps both presentations. The results can differ because the second report has a different subject of inquiry.

Questions for the Account

An issue for Frege concerns how to tell when two people grasp the same sense. The difference between a private image and a shared sense tells us why a difference in visualization need not matter. It does not give a test for every case. Two people might agree on a name's bearer but offer different ways of identifying that bearer. Frege's note about Aristotle allows for such divergence in ordinary language. In a conversation where the exact thought matters, asking what someone means by the name is one way to discover whether there is a relevant difference. The possibility of asking that question also shows what the theory has to explain: objectivity does not make a particular speaker's contribution obvious in every situation. Frege, note at p. 27 and discussion at pp. 29–31

A related question concerns empty expressions in more regimented use. The distinction allows a grammatically well-formed expression to make sense without guaranteeing a referent. That flexibility is helpful in explaining how a story can be understood. In a system for reasoning about truth, we may want every admissible singular term to have a referent. Frege discusses a requirement of this sort for a logically adequate language. The two settings impose different demands. Permitting readers to follow a story without settling the status of its characters does not settle what expressions our formal inferences should allow. Frege, pp. 32–34 and 40–41

Indirect discourse creates another test. The account should explain when an apparent failure of substitution results from a change in reference and when the clause does a different job. Frege considers a construction about the discoverer of the elliptical form of planetary orbits. The dependent material helps pick out Kepler. A phrase that serves in this way cannot simply be replaced with any other string that happens to express a true proposition. Its grammatical role contributes to how the full sentence is put together. The distinction between sense and reference is a starting point for this analysis, but the structure of the particular report still matters. Frege, pp. 39–40 and 49–50

A Reading Exercise

Imagine an art collection with two record entries. One identifies a painting by the number on its frame. The other identifies a painting by the name under which it entered the collection. After checking the records, a curator realizes that the two entries refer to one painting. She has learned something useful even though the number of paintings did not change. The case is an analogy for the identity puzzle. The fact that two database fields agree says little by itself about how human speakers grasp a thought.

Now suppose a second curator believes that the work with the frame number needs repair. She has never heard the accession name and has not connected it to the painting. The two curators can speak about the painting using one or both descriptions. An accurate report about what the second curator believes requires attention to what she understood. Recording the accession name as an alias improves the catalogue. It doesn't attribute new knowledge to the curator. The example makes the difference between identifying an object and explaining the significance of an identity claim easier to see.

Try applying the same test to the opening diagram. One listener knows how to construct the first intersection and the second. Another has seen the drawing but understands only one of the descriptions. Both may point at the same mark. Only the first is in a position to consider the thought that the two constructions identify one point. The important difference lies in what these particular listeners have grasped. You can change the details of the case until it stops working, for example by showing both listeners how each construction works and telling them in advance that the results coincide. Then ask what changed about their understanding and what stayed fixed about the diagram.

Three Kinds of Question About a Sentence

The diagram also gives a way of keeping the example honest. Draw the first two lines, mark their intersection, and then draw a third line that misses the mark. You can still understand the two descriptions and can identify both intersections, assuming the relevant lines cross. This time the points are different. That result gives a clear example of what can stay fixed across a change in reference. The directions for identifying the intersections are intelligible in either drawing. Which point each direction leads to depends on the drawing we are discussing. The exercise uses the diagram to vary the setting; it is not meant as a theory of geometric names in a formal language.

Consider next three separate questions you could ask about the figure. You could ask which point the description identifies, whether the two descriptions identify one point, or whether the person drawing the figure already knows that they do. The first asks us to find a reference. The second asks us to evaluate an identity. The third asks us to understand someone’s judgment. In the third case it helps to specify the thought at issue. Someone could know there is a point at the first intersection and still be unsure whether the third line crosses there too. The additional uncertainty is compatible with getting the first description right.

Sometimes a single response might look as if it answers all three questions. Pointing to an intersection can identify it for an observer who sees both constructions. But pointing would not explain the relation to the third line to someone who cannot see that line. That difference is a reason to ask what information the response supplied, even after we agree what object it was about.

Further Reading

Start with Max Kölbel’s English translation of the opening and conclusion. The bracketed numbers refer to the original journal pagination. The full German text contains the detailed discussion of subordinate clauses. Read the opening identity problem alongside the last paragraph. The intervening investigation explains why a difference in thought can be significant even when the truth value and the underlying reference agree.

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@misc{brenndoerfer2026freges-3, author = {Michael Brenndoerfer}, title = {Frege's On Sense and Reference: Why an Identity Can Inform}, year = {2026}, url = {https://mbrenndoerfer.com/writing/frege-sense-reference-sinn-bedeutung-guide}, organization = {mbrenndoerfer.com}, note = {Accessed: 2026-11-19} }
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